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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
THREE ESSAYS ON THE ECONOMICS OF DEFENSE CONTRACTING,
OUTPUT AND INCOME INEQUALITY
by
Edward M. DeCambra
Florida International University, 2014
Miami, Florida
Professor Hakan Yilmazkuday, Major Professor
This dissertation analyzes both the economics of the defense contracting process
and the impact of total dollar obligations on the economies of U.S. states. Using various econometric techniques, I will estimate relationships across individual contracts,
state level output, and income inequality. I will achieve this primarily through the
use of a dataset on individual contract obligations.
The first essay will catalog the distribution of contracts and isolate aspects of
the process that contribute to contract dollar obligations. Accordingly, this study
describes several characteristics about individual defense contracts, from 1966-2006:
(i) the distribution of contract dollar obligations is extremely rightward skewed, (ii)
contracts are unevenly distributed in a geographic sense across the United States,
(iii) increased duration of a contract by 10 percent is associated with an increase
in costs by 4 percent, (iv) competition does not seem to affect dollar obligations
in a substantial way, (v) contract pre-payment financing increases the obligation of
contracts from anywhere from 62 to 380 percent over non-financed contracts.
The second essay will turn to an aggregate focus, and look the impact of defense
spending on state economic output. The analysis in chapter two attempts to estimate
the state level fiscal multiplier, deploying Difference-in-Differences estimation as an
attempt to filter out potential endogeneity bias. Interstate variation in procurement

v

spending facilitates utilization of a natural experiment scenario, focusing on the spike
in relative spending in 1982. The state level relative multiplier estimate here is 1.19,
and captures the short run, impact effect of the 1982 spending spike.
Finally I will look at the relationship between defense contracting and income
inequality. Military spending has typically been observed to have a negative relationship with income inequality. The third chapter examines the existence of this
relationship, combining data on defense procurement with data on income inequality
at the state level, in a longitudinal analysis across the United States. While the estimates do not suggest a significant relationship exists for the income share of the top
ten percent of households, there is a significant positive relationship for the income
share of top one percent households for an increase in defense procurement.
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CHAPTER 1
THE DISTRIBUTION OF DEFENSE PROCUREMENT

1.1

Introduction

Military contracting has long been a highly politicized and often controversial subject.
This has especially been the case in the post World War II political landscape of the
United States where, for the first time, an extremely well-trained and equipped peacetime military presence was formed (?). It was in the new military era that D.W.
Eisenhower coined the poignant moniker the “Military Industrial Complex” at a time
when the U.S. was heading into the Cold War. The U.S. has since dealt with seemingly
endless waves of wartime threats, with the drumbeats of past exercises echoing into the
next. These wars combined with global policing has established a large and poorly
understood institution solely devoted to the development and production of goods
and services for the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD). This essay aims to improve
understanding of defense contracting by quantifying and describing a multitude of
contracting characteristics, using the vast pool of data on individual contracts.
The tacit agreement among lawmakers of establishing a permanent, relatively large
defense budget seems to now be on shaky ground. Recent episodes of fiscal crises in
the federal government of the United States have created a climate of increased willingness for cuts from all forms of federal spending, driving many previously unwilling
politicians towards the defense budget. With no abatement of the Budget Control
Act of 2011 (BCA), sequestration of the DoD budget took effect to the amount for
37 billion dollars for the second half of 2013, and will amount to 470 billion dollars
over the following decade (?). As currently written, the sequestration is designed
as an intentionally ham-fisted approach to reduce spending, cutting all programs it
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targets equally hard (?)1 . As reported by http://USAspending.gov/2 , from 2002 to
2013 the department of defense has contracted between 171 and 361 billion dollars
per fiscal year. Relative to the size of procurement spending, these cuts are far from
insignificant, and those in charge must find innovative ways to improve the efficiency
of operations to minimize the negative effects of reduced budgets.
The goal of this essay is to catalog the behavior of defense contracting to provide
some insight into the sources of expense in the contracting process, with the hope
that the information can be used to develop more efficient structures of contracting
going forward. To achieve this, I will use a broad analysis of contract prices; both
their distributional landscape as well as influences from a number of factors. By using
a rich dataset of individually recorded contracts, the information here will describe
how contracts behave, and what factors such as their timing, location, duration,
administrative structures, and other characteristics possibly influence their dollar
obligation. Having a detailed economic description of the motivating factors that
influence contract cost will be a valuable tool for efficiency improvements in the
defense procurement process. Also if Capitol Hill can find common ground, the
cleaver of sequestration may be replaced with the scalpel that many politicians want.
While the sequestration was designed to be a temporary political bargaining tool,
politicians now see that cuts to defense have become a political possibility, foretelling
the future for defense contracting regardless of the lifespan of the BCA. The results
presented here bring valuable information to those appropriating funds, including how
1 All

appropriation programs and activities are affected at the individual program level
by an equally sever percentage except those contained within operations and maintenance
(OM), which is applied at the overall account level. Within OM There is flexibility to
allocate the portion of cuts they must enact, in a more efficient way across programs to
minimize the ill effects of the cuts, but not for procurement generally
2 The

website http://USAspending.gov/ was launched in 2007 as a response to the Federal Funding Accountability and Transparency Act (FFATA) of 2006, and established by
the Office of Management and Budget within the U.S. federal government.
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to best allocate what may prove to be a significantly slimmed budget over the years
to come.
Furthermore, a detailed account of both the dollar distribution and of influential
factors for contracting may provide insights into how to correct often cited systemic
flaws and inefficiencies in the process. The Government Accountability Office has
attributed a 31 billion dollar rise in the cost of major defense systems to inefficiencies in the procurement and production process for the fiscal year of 2011 alone (?).
Authors have long scrutinized the defense contracting process from many vantage
points; political underpinnings and motivations (??), contractor corruption and impropriety (?), and economic incentives motivating contractors (??). The majority
of these studies focus on either aggregated data or on anecdotal incidents of abuse3 .
Going straight to the individual contract will provide the information necessary for
evaluating various policies and procedures that influence costs more directly.
The first chapter will also benefit studies that utilize government procurement as
a source of fiscal spending shocks, by providing guidance on the suitability of defense
procurement data in answering one’s policy question. Defense procurement is by far
the largest source of federal procurement spending, accounting for typically 70 percent
of all contracting dollars for the past several decades (see table 1.2). Considering the
substantial size of the appropriations, defense spending has long been an attractive
source of data used to answer broad macroeconomic questions. Aggregate defense
spending is often cited and used for its purported exogeneity from economic events
that are otherwise difficult to estimate precisely, and used with the hope of yielding
unbiased estimates of the causal effects (???). Better understanding of the behavior
of individual contracts can provide clearer direction for the use of this subset of federal
3 See

?, ?, ? and ? for cases of State level aggregated studies regarding total dollars
contracted, with various analytical techniques applied. Alternatively, using a disaggregated
analysis ? conduct a study based on press reports of contractor impropriety.
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spending in these aggregate level studies. Studies that attempt to answer political
economic questions regarding national defense that use aggregated spending typically
only indirectly estimate those effects, using aggregate federal budget outlays as proxies
for the actual obligated dollars (??). By using the micro-data one can isolate and
control for geographic, time, and good level characteristics. Accounting for these
unobservable effects allows more precise estimation of the directly measurable effects
of interest, not otherwise possible in aggregate level studies.
A few studies do however analyze the influences on contracts at the micro level.
? looks more broadly at federal contracting, using the individual actions of appropriation ordered by congress to estimate the impact that congressional political
distribution has on contract size. ? studied individual contract dollar obligation
from the federal government to measure timing effects of year end spending. The
present study differs from earlier studies first in its focus solely on defense related
contracting, and second in the scope of this project which has a substantially longer
time span than previous studies. This study will serve as a modest catalog of defense
contracting facts, utilizing the large pool of individual data points to produce a series
of summary statistics about the functioning and idiosyncrasies of the defense process.
These statistics will prove helpful in motivating later studies by elucidating the influential determinants of government contracting, and suggest aspects of the process
that may prove fruitful for efficiency gains with respect to cost.
To foreshadow the results, there are a series of seven main results that are developed throughout this essay. First, the distribution of individual contract dollar
obligations is highly rightward skewed, with a relatively small amount of expensive
contracts stretching the distribution substantially. Second, the geographic distribution is also skewed, where a few states account for significant portions of contract
spending, measured by both frequency and total dollars. California consistently is

4

the State where the majority of contracts are awarded. While during recent years
states experience relatively greater geographic dispersion, the general trend of concentration in relatively few states holds across the dataset. Third, regression estimates
suggest that annual aggregate fixed effects collectively account for the largest portion
of variation in contracting dollars, in the range of 20-25 percent of total dollar obligation variance. The influence of annual effects suggests that annual aggregate shocks
have historically had the strongest impact on individual contract awards, where these
shocks can take the form of changes in political directives, military missions and goals,
or even actions by foreign agents.
Fourth, firm-fixed price contracts are by and large the most economical contract
type, from the government’s perspective. Firm, fixed price contracts of contract
accounts for the majority of awards but far from all, and alternative contract types
cost significantly more for the government: fixed price contracts with additional fees
paid to contractors experience increases in contract obligations from 50 to 116 percent,
and cost type contracts push contract prices up anywhere from 120 to 400 percent.
Fifth contract financing4 is associated with increases in obligations by anywhere from
62 percent up to 400 percent. Across all financing the government has a preferred
hierarchy of finance types, determined by the perceived riskiness of each type of
financing. Estimates suggest that the most preferred financing type (the least risky)
also corresponds to the financing type with the largest average increase in contract
dollars. In fact the order of preferred financing is exactly opposite to the order of
average costliness of those financing types, which brings into suspect the justification
for this preference ordering in the first place. These two findings highlight potential
sources for future process restructuring and possible savings.
4 Contract

financing is the early payment of a contract by a portion of the contract, or
entirely, prior to the delivery of goods or services or the end of a contract.
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Sixth, increased duration of a contract are associated with increased dollar obligations. Specifically, for an increase in the duration of a contract by ten percent,
the associated rise in obligated dollars is around 4 percent. And seventh, promotion
of competition does not seem to be as powerful a tool for potential savings as it is
often suggested to be, particularly when compared to the cost impacts associated
with contract types and financing mentioned above. While contracts that are not
awarded through competitive means are more expensive, the increase in cost is as low
as 3 percent and only as high as 14 percent. Combining the relative unimportance
of competition in dollar variation with the results surrounding contract types and
contract financing previously mentioned, a shift from solely the promotion contract
competition towards a restructuring of the process may prove to be the most effective
way in reducing contract costs.
The rest of the chapter will progress as follows. The next section will discuss the
data sources for this project, along with some potential pitfalls contained therein and
how they are addressed. Section three will go through the meta-data on the pool of
individual contracts to provide a set of descriptive statistics on contract dynamics
and characteristics. The set of descriptive characteristics is compiled by both pooling
and filtering the contracts across time, state, and goods, in order to get a detailed and
comprehensive understanding of the dimensions of contracting. The fourth section
will estimate relationships between individual contracts and a number of influential
factors: time, geography, good types and contracting structures. Finally concluding
remarks will be provided.

1.2

Data Sources

The data employed in the analysis here is compiled from a variety of sources, including the Bureau of Economic Analysis, the Bureau of Labor Statistics, the United
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States Census Bureau, the Department of Defense, and the Federal Procurement Data
System. Combined, these data sources form a panel of contracts from 1966 - 2012.
As mentioned previously, data from individual prime military contracts are the
crux of this study. The records of military prime contracts are provided by the
United States Department of Defense, recorded on forms DD-350. The fiscal years
of 1966-2006 are cataloged by the Statistical Information Analysis Devision (SIAD)
of the Department of Defense5 . Form DD 350 was required to summarize individual contracts with a net dollar amount above a threshold, where contracts below
this threshold are collectively described. For the data from 1966-1983, the amount
pertains to contracts whose net value is above 10,000 dollars. As a result of administrative changes brought on by the Competition in Contracting Act of 1984 (CICA)
this threshold increased to 25,000 dollars. To provide clarity, a sample of form DD
350 from 1998 is presented in figure 1.1. The dataset contains observations on dollar
obligations, deobligations, and contract modifications that may be below the threshold or even a zero dollar observation, as these observations modify previous actions,
where the net amount exceed the threshold. Also as a result of moves to modernize
the Federal Procurement Data System (FPDS) starting in 2004, this threshold was
no longer utilized, and all contract actions were reported6 .
These data provide a wealth of information. Each contract form may contain
information on the contractual details such as the type of contract, dollar obligation, financing of the contract, the signed date of the award, the expected terminal
5 Legacy

data is stored on the Internet for fiscal years 1966 to 2006,
http://siadapp.dmdc.osd.mil/procurement/Procurement.html.
6 In

at

the fiscal year of 2004, the FPDS began a shift in data reporting structures that no
longer separated contracting actions below 25 thousand dollars from larger dollar contracts.
The practice of collectively summarizing the lower dollar amounts began to be phased out in
FY 2004 and this transition was completed in FY 2007. As a result the data sets beginning
in 2005 contain many more observations than early fiscal years, principally because they
include all contracts.
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date of the contract, the location of the work to be performed, depending on the
record keeping requirements of that fiscal year. For contracts during the period of
1966-1983, each observation contains upwards of 31 different data points. After the
CICA in 1984 we see the collection of information increase substantially to about
90 different data points. These data points include more detailed information on
the terms of the contract like financing of the contract if applicable and details on
the individual contractor such as whether the business is women or minority owned,
the size of the business at various degrees of precision, etc. The increased collection
of data evolved in an effort towards increased accountability for various legislative
economic mandates7 . To provide some insight into how the data appear, an individual observation from the fiscal year file of 1998 is provided in table 1.1. While
not intended to be representative of the entire panel, the content of the observation
presented provides the general flavor of the information contained here. While the
exact information changes over time depending on current and phased out legislation
and various political programs that come and go, a great deal of this information used
in the subsequent analysis is available for periods of greater than 10 years, allowing
significant scope for interesting and telling estimations.
For more recent years, 2007-2012, contract procurement data are garnered from
the Federal Procurement Data System and stored at the website developed by the
Office of Management and Budget, at http://usaspending.gov/. This information
will further be supplemented with data from the Federal Procurement Data System - Next Generation (FPDS-NG) found at https://www.fpds.gov/ which collects
information on federal contracting more broadly. These data are used in effort to
provide a frame of reference to understand defense contracting in the context of over7 As

an example, federal laws aimed at bolstering small disadvantaged businesses or
minority owned enterprises that developed out of Small Business Administration programs.
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all contracting. These more recent observations have richer set of information than
the previous ones, mostly because of changes in data reporting standards within the
federal government and the ease of digital reporting. These files are merged with the
earlier data points to generate a time span of slightly more than 46 years, between
1966-2012, with upwards of 22 million individual contract observations available for
analysis.
As is common in databases that were compiled from sources existing prior to
widespread computer usage, the early datasets contain many missing observations
for some variables other than the date, location and primary dollar obligation. The
relative sparseness is not the case for observations existing from 2005 and on, as the
FPDS-NG was implemented and greatly improved the precision of record keeping
within federal procurements. Therefore depending on the type of study, and level
of refinement or aggregation, these errors may or may not greatly affect the results.
With such an extensive pool of individual contract action observations, one can expect
improved precision and robustness against such measurement errors, and throughout
this study care will be taken to appropriately address possible issues around sample
size and irregularities in record keeping across time
Aggregate CPI data is gathered from the BEA, and is available in monthly and
annual frequencies with a base year of 1983-1984. Unfortunately historical data on
State level prices is not available, where the BLS only publishes CPI data at national
and regional level8 . As such, a great deal of the analysis within is conducted contract
dollars deflated with the aggregate annual CPI for the full time span of our panel of
1966-2012.
8 These

regions are also somewhat broad; Northeast, Midwest, South and West. One
can easily imagine large variation of prices within these regions, say between Montana and
California, both in the Western region.
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1.3

Defense Contracting in the United States

In order to fully characterize contracts and the processes that motivate procurement,
this section will build the foundational information regarding defense contracting.
First the process of defense contracting will be briefly outlined, describing the regulations that dictate the process and how scholars have characterized it since. Second I
will describe the general distribution of contracting from many dimensions to provide
insight into what questions can and can not be answered using defense spending.
Then the distribution of contracts across both time and geographic regions will be
discussed and how these factors may influence any subsequent analysis. Finally we
will focus on procurement across goods and service categories.

1.3.1

The Defense Contracting Process

For obvious reasons, defense contracting is a politicized and often controversial subset
of federal spending, and as such regulations that dictate their solicitation, obligation,
and enforcement are outlined at length by several hundreds of pages of federal law9 . In
addition to this, the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) issues almost 2000 pages of
procedures in finer detail regarding procurement more generally, which also applies to
defense related contracting. Therefore it is prudent to briefly outline the contracting
process to provide a baseline of understanding and context for this analysis.
9 US

code pertaining to the armed forces defines the rules around procurement is 10
U.S.C §2301-2335 devotes roughly 150 pages to the broad codification of US law around
defense procurement. Further US code title 41 U.S.C §1301-1312 issues the authority to
establish the Federal Acquisition Regulation.
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Contract Competition
The legislation is written so the principle preference for contract officers should be
to allow for full and open competition of each procurement advertisement through
competitive procedures10 . While this is the preference, full and open competition for
contracts is not always strictly required, and the majority of the legislation pertaining to procurement competition is devoted to describing caveats to this requirement.
Such caveats are typically described as circumstances where concern for future supply, national defense, lack of capable sources, or urgent need exist, to name a few.
Furthermore the head of the agency, specifically the Secretaries of Defense, the Army,
the Navy, and the Air Force have significant latitude to limit competition, but must
justify such reasoning to congress. The nature and degree of competition in procurement is among the most controversial dimensions of defense contracting. In March
of 2009, President Obama issued a memorandum stating that federal agencies must
inspect their contracting practices in order to promote competition and reduce sole
source contracts as much as is possible in order to reduce waste and increase efficiency
in procured goods and services (?). Considering the official reports of waste and inefficiency (?) and various academic studies inspecting contractor abuse which provide
anecdotal reports of misuse and waste (???), efforts to increase competition has long
been the most politically attractive method for efficiency gains in contracting.
There are the obvious benefits of reduced costs, improved quality or both as a result of increasing competition for each contract awarded. Increased competition mayh
also come with the downside however of longer award-decision timetables than noncompeted contracts, which may unduly delay needed procurements. Also consider
the negative impacts of increased award uncertainty on research and development
10 Competitive

procedures are typically defined as sealed bidding or competitive proposals

(?).
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decisions. The increased award uncertainty may push firms away from bidding on
contracts, even if they have a potentially innovative process, or solution to any particular contract solicitation. The inclusion of otherwise omitted contractors is one
reason that a contracting officer may restrict the degree of competition or eliminate
it all together if there are clear benefits to the government.
This dataset contains information on the extent of competition each contract
faces; describing the extent of allowable competition and also the number of offers
received. Of the more than 22 million contract observations contained within this
dataset, 56.4 percent of all contracts were subject to full and open competition while
18.5 percent were subject to non-compete procedures, and of the contracts subject to
full and open competition, 17.5 percent received only one offer. Table 1.2 describes
how contract dollar obligations are split across degrees of contract competition. One
aspect that is unclear from the dataset is a direct measure of contractor performance,
i.e., contract outcomes. However we can look at the signed price of a contract, and it
is clear that there are reductions in mean if not median dollar obligations as a result
of competition. In section 1.4 we will directly estimate the impact of competition on
individual contract dollars to see the potential for savings by promotion of competitive
procedures.

Contract Types
The DoD can enter into procurement contracts that fall into one of two broad categories: fixed-price contracts or cost-reimbursement contracts. The primary difference
between these two categories is which party assumes the risk of an unforeseen rise in
costs during the duration of the contract, with the former falling on contractors and
the latter falling on the government and ultimately the taxpayer (?). The government can choose the appropriate type of contract pricing to best meet its needs while
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procuring the highest quality and most cost effective item or service, and arguments
for or against either type of contract are closely related to promotion of competition listed above. Again FAR language is clear that preference is to sign fixed-price
type contracts, which taxpayers would also prefer as they shift the risks onto the
contractor. However this shift in risk burden may discourage or limit contractor participation in current, and perhaps more importantly future bidding, depending on
the product or service being procured. Cost type contracts are often geared towards
research and development work, or work with non-profit institutions or universities,
where the risks are significantly higher and this discouragement effect would be significant. Therefore beyond a few restrictions the contracting officer can choose the type
of contract that best benefits the government during solicitation; on the basis of the
complexity, degree of market competition, urgency and a number of other factors that
apply to the contract at hand, or decide on the contract type upon negotiation with
a specific contractor. Within these main two types are the following levels of refinement: firm-fixed-price, fixed-price-with-economic-price-adjustment, fixed-price- redetermination, fixed-price-level-of-effort, cost-contract, cost-sharing, cost-plus-fixed-fee,
cost-plus-award-fee, fixed-price-incentive, cost-plus-incentive-fee, time-and-materials,
and labor-hour.
To provide some detail of the distribution across types contract pricing and payment structures, table 1.3 provides some summary statistics. As is clear in the table,
firm fixed price contracts account for the majority of all contracts signed at 78.5
percent. The cases of cost type contracts, with the risk all or mostly falling on the
government, account for fewer but far from an insignificant amount of all contracts.
With the discussion surrounding risk which ultimately translates to expense, one
should expect that fixed price type contracts typically cost the government less and
exhibit less spread in their distribution. The risk seems to be born out in the data
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in the form of higher priced contracts, with both the mean and median of various
fixed price contracts significantly lower than those seen across cost type contracts.
Furthermore the skewness of fixed price contracts is also less severe than cost type
contracts whose end dollar amount is less certain at the original signing date.

Award, Payment, and Financing of Contracts
As outlined in the FAR11 a contract invoice must be paid no later than the 30th day
after either the receipt of the contracted item or services, or the receipt of the invoice
by the appropriate billing office, which ever comes later. Typically this payment
occurs upon delivery of the products or completion of the contract.
Alternatively the government can opt for contract financing, where the government pays for a portion or all of a contract in advance of receiving items or before the
completion of the contract. Contract financing, while not applicable to all contractors or contracts, is intended to be another tool for the contracting officer to promote
effective competition and inclusion of the best possible sources for each contract.
The government can opt to finance contracts in the form of partial or percentage
of progress payments, advance payments or other terms. Furthermore, contractors
are invited to submit individual financing terms for contract payments into original
proposals, which will be taken into account during the award stage. Information on
a particular contract’s financing is available from fiscal years 1989 to 2011. Although
the details of the terms of financing for valid contracts are not known, the data will
provide insight into the impact that various types of financing have on the obligated
dollars of a contract. The levels of contract financing presented in this dataset are:
progress payments, percent completion progress payments, unusual progress or ad11 The

section of the Federal Acquisitions Regulations that pertains to contract financing
is subpart 32.9.
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vance payments, commercial financing, performance based financing or if financing
does not apply.
Furthermore, the type of contracts, be they fixed price or cost, does not preclude
that contract from receiving financing. The distribution of contract types among
financed contracts is roughly consistent with the distribution of contract types across
all contracts more broadly. Table 1.4 provides the distribution across various types
of financing for that contract. If financing terms are included in a contract, the
FAR directs contracting officers towards a preference for financing via progress or
percentage of completion payments, which comes through in the data accounting for
more than 70 percent of all financed contracts12 .

1.3.2

The Distribution of Contract Spending

Defense contracting has historically accounted for the lion’s share of federal procurement. As stated in ?, the United States made a permanent shift towards maintaining
a significant standing army, in part as response to the threat of communism and in
part as corporate welfare to the defense industry. As such, the Department of Defense has accounted for on average 71.5 percent of all federal procurement dollars
and typically between 60 and 80 percent of spending in the past several decades, as
shown in table 1.5. The immense size of defense contracting, both relative to all
federal contracts and in absolute terms, suggests significant potential to influence
the economy, and part of why defense spending is such an attractive source of fiscal
shocks for researchers. The size and power of defense spending however only further
12 As

with much of the FAR, the reasoning for limiting usage of advanced payments is to
provide limited governmental exposure to financial loss in the event of a failure to deliver
any contracted goods or services.

15

motivates the need for better understanding of what influences contract dollars, and
the following exposition will cover the landscape of contracts with this goal in mind.
Furthermore when addressing the general distribution of contracts, one must account for changes in administrative record keeping that may affect the shape of the
distribution. As previously mentioned the data in this study are gathered from the
individual contracts described on the DoD’s form DD-350 for internal record keeping
purposes. Until 2004, the DoD would send monthly reports to the Federal Procurement Data System that summarized reports below 25,000 dollars, reported on form
DD 1057. During the modernization to the Federal Procurement Data System-Next
Generation (FPDS-NG), there was a move to eliminate this distinction, and subsequently all contracts were individually summarized regardless of dollar size. These
restrictions on the data availability of contracts applies primarily to the number of
actions, and not necessarily the dollar value. ? suggest that contract dollar size
is highly skewed from 2004-2009. Extending the analysis back to the 1980’s, figure
1.2 suggests this case still holds true for the time span of 1980-2011. Note that on
the basis of frequency counts, defense contracts reported on form DD-350 account
for a relatively small percent of all Federal contracts. However these relatively few
contracts account for the vast majority of both defense contracting dollars and all
federal contracting dollars. Depending on the type of one’s study, these distinctions
may make a huge impact, i.e, consider utilizing aggregated dollars. A study deploying
aggregate dollars would not see a huge impact in the results, but if a study is using
micro level data, the skew could greatly influence any subsequent results.
To further illustrate the degree of skewness in contract dollars, figure 1.3 displays
the kernel density estimation of all dollar observations in the inner 80th percentiles.
Clear in the illustration is the extreme degree of skewness in contract spending. If
observations are constricted further to the inner quartile, significant skewness is still
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evident. The pattern of serious skew indicates that care should be employed when
looking at contracts on an individual basis, where such extreme outliers may bias
one’s results.
To gain some insight into how the administrative changes may impact any study
on contracts, the dataset is split into sections. There are two significant changes in
administrative record keeping. First occurred when the summarization threshold was
raised, and second change was the elimination of a threshold entirely, in FY 1984
and FY 2004 respectively. Fiscal year 2004 particularly important in this regard,
where the elimination of the summarization threshold means that all contracts are
now recorded, instead of just those above the threshold. By including all of the
smaller contracts could significantly diminish the skewed nature of the data, masking
its severity in the data. As seen in top half of table 1.6, this is exactly the case.
The period of 1984-2003 displays the most sever, positive skew, with the fattest right
tail of any subset of fiscal years. The latter period, 2004-2012 exhibits the least
skewed data, but is still slightly rightward skewed. Therefore, beyond an inspection
of outliers mentioned above, one should also be cognizant of these clerical changes
and the influence it may exert on any results. For example the estimations in the
next section have the potential to be significantly affected if the estimation sample
spans these events, and the structural breaks were unaccounted for. These breaks
will be dealt with more explicitly in subsection 1.3.3.
To further inspect these outliers, table 1.7 lists the statistics for the tails of the
contract spending distribution; below the 10th percentile and above 90th percentile.
After sub-setting the outer deciles into several groups it becomes clear that a great
majority of the skew in spending comes from the most extreme observations. For
example, the coefficient of skewness is 1267 for the entire last decile, but for decile
observations excluding those above the 99th percentile, the skewness is only 1.88. This
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behavior is similar to the pattern displayed in the first decile. With this information
we further restrict our analysis to the outer one percentiles as the source of the best
possible candidates for a purge of outliers.
Table 1.8 repeats calculations from table 1.3 after a series of less restrictive outlier
cuts are made for the outer 1, 0.1 and 0.01 percentiles. It is clear that these extreme
percentile of either tail are responsible for a great deal of skew in the data. The most
evident change between table 1.3 and table 1.8 is the fall in the skewness coefficient
by more than 67 percent. Another result of this sub-setting is a significant drop
in the variance, as measured through the standard deviation of each subset. While
this reduction in the variance should be expected, the shift is substantial regardless
of the outlier grouping. A third significant difference is the smoothing of previous
structural record keeping changes across the observations from different fiscal year
groupings. Without the extreme observations, we see that the statistics across all
groups of contracts are much more comparable, yielding a dataset of contract dollars
that is less skewed, less noisy and smoother over its span.
As this outlier analysis is further refined, the outer .01 percent finally yields a
sample small enough to comb through directly. As may be inferred from table 1.7,
some the most extreme observations display almost concurrent offsetting amounts,
first obligated then quickly deobligated. These may come about as a result of clerical
mistakes, impropriety on the part of a contractor or unforeseen events which will result in a contractual breach. To look at the most extreme cases with the observations
are sorted by spending size, the top and bottom ten contracts contain several observations that represent initial obligations, followed by the subsequent deobligation of
a majority of the dollar amount. For example, the single largest contract by dollar
value in the entire dataset was originally signed for 116,091,716,928 and obligated
on August 24, 2009, only to be deobligated three days later to net result of 358,227
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dollars owed by the contractor. Also the next two largest contract obligations, for
24 and 13 billion dollars were later modified to a net of zero and 15 million dollars
respectively13 .
Whether these outliers represent clerical or administrative errors or possible yearend signing push, it poses serious empirical issues to researchers looking to utilize
this data at the contract level. Directly digging through more than the outer 10 most
contracts quickly becomes intractable, particularly with the multitude of observations
in the dataset. Aggregation of the data will typically net out these issues, depending
on the resolution and time frequency of that aggregation14 . However if one is utilizing
individual contracts in a study these extreme outliers have potential to bias the results.
The potential for bias further strengthens the argument for the parsimonious and
seemingly effective drop of the outer .01 percentiles. With the evidence that outliers
significantly stretch the distribution and may bias results from micro level studies, it
would behoove researchers to seriously consider a purge of extreme observations with
regard to dollar obligations.
13 The

second largest contract in the dataset was for a total of 24,051,635,569, signed
on October 31, 2006, and deobligated fully on the same day. The third largest contract,
totaling 13,917,176,427, was signed on September 29, 2008, and deobligated the next fiscal
year on January 7, 2009 to net 15,252,000, which represents a drastic drop from the original
amount. Also the three largest observations in the entire panel are also the only three
observations that are over 10 billion dollars, with the next largest starting at 3.9 billion
14 Depending

on the time frequency if the data is utilized in a time series or panel framework, issues arise when these irregular contracts are not corrected immediately. This may
result in one time period spending observation being unduly large and the next unduly
small. Intuitively the less frequent the time periods the less this is potentially a problem,
but in the example provided by the third largest contract, aggregation across calendar years
instead of fiscal years would still cause this to be an issue.
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1.3.3

Defense Contracting Across Time

Defense contracting has seen significant shifts in the past few decades. ? and ?
describe several periods that exhibit a significant military buildup, in both the frequency of contracts and the dollar amount of spending on procurements. Two of
these periods are entirely covered by the data contained in the present study: the
Carter-Regan era military buildup which began in January, 1980 and the events of
September 9, 2001. These authors also suggest a third buildup that is partially contained in this panel, namely that of the Vietnamese war, beginning in 1965. Figure
1.4 charts the annual totals of contract spending, with both the current value and
inflation adjusted figures pictured. The evidence of the benefits of deflating the contract dollars is inherent and observable in the charts. Also note that the timing of
buildups indicated by ? is displayed quite clearly, particularly when adjusting for
inflation. Each of these dates displays the beginning of significant military buildups,
as displayed by large, multi-year expansions of contract spending15 .
As alluded to in the previous section, one could make further restrictions on
the data to help improve consistency across the data panel by fully eliminating any
observations below the summarized reporting thresholds. The right two graphs in
figure 1.4 display this very filter, where below threshold contract observations were
purged prior to the calculation of these statistics16 . Note that while there is a nominal
shift in the data, the general trend of the annual totals is relatively unaltered. The
15 As

suggested by ? and ?, these dates signify large scale and prolonged buildup in
defense spending, as well as the Korean war which is outside of the timespan of this panel.
16 This

purge entails omitting all contract observations below 10,000 dollars prior to FY
1984 and all contract dollars below 25,000 after 1984. For the period from FY 2005 to FY
2012, discerning which observations below 25,000 account for a below threshold observation
and which account for a modification to an above threshold observation is impossible. While
purging all observations below these two thresholds attenuates the aggregate totals for the
periods prior to FY 2005, it provides a consistent view of the data across time.
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consistency even holds true for the later years, where the greatest amount of the
affected observations lie. The result of filtering low dollars is expected for aggregate
spending though, again being reminded of the data in table 1.5, where a great deal of
the total spending is derived from a relatively small pool of the largest observations,
and the below threshold contracts historically count for about ten percent or less of
all total contracting dollars. Also removing below threshold observations does not
seem to affect the annual standard deviations, only slightly reducing them for the
filtered data.
The post filter consistency is not the case however for the micro oriented statistics
however, particularly contract frequency, and mean and median dollar obligation. To
illustrate the lack of consistency, figure 1.5 lists these three graphs for deflated data,
before and after omitting below threshold observations. After performing the filter,
the micro-oriented statistics in the graphs experience a significant and visible change
compared with the non-filtered data. With the unfiltered data, casual observation
of the graphs would accurately suggest a significant structural change in the data
beginning roughly around 2004. After filtering the data however, the evidence of
structural break around the end of the time period is not so clear. The amount of
information loss resulting from omitting below threshold contracts is not insignificant
however, with the result of a purge of roughly 43 percent of the original data.
Next to the results from figure 1.5 and the visible impact of the threshold cut, the
much smaller purge of the outer tails of our contract distribution described in section
1.3.2 suggests a more nuanced impact on our summary statistics. Results of these
outlier purges are shown in figure 1.6. The displayed statistics are from the dataset
cut as presented in table 1.8, beginning with the outer most 1 percent and dropping
less observations in subsequent frames. Consistent with the impacts described in
1.3.2, changes resulting from these outlier omissions in this figure appear mostly to
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be nominal. It is clear that the totals in each year, and the range of those totals,
are reduced when compared with the entire dataset but the shape and general trends
remains generally unchanged after any of these outlier cuts. To further illustrate the
impacts of this outlier filter on the distribution of the data, figure 1.7 duplicates the
statistics presented in figure 1.5, after omitting the outer .01 percentile. Unlike the
obvious and striking impact seen in figure 1.5, omitting the outer .01 percentile seems
to retain the structural shift in the statistics that is present in the unfiltered data.
The question of whether to use the threshold filter which results in a large scale
reduction of observations, or the outlier-tail omission which retains the majority of observations but does not address the structural changes in data collection, is answered
by the goal of the research at hand. Deploying defense contracting in aggregate,
macroeconomic research would benefit most from the smallest purge of data; dropping only the outer 0.01 percentiles. The parsimonious outlier filter retains the scale
of aggregate totals that are necessary in macro studies while addressing the possibility
of errant contract mistakes present in the most severe outliers. Furthermore if the
study has a microeconomic bent that utilizes individual contracts as the population
of interest, pooling contract data across the structural breaks described here presents
the possibility of biased results. Using the threshold filter described above could help
to address these changes in contract reporting methods helping to increase sample
size and estimation precision instead of simply splitting the data across these periods.

Seasonality
Turning now to focus more on a seasonal perspective, figure 1.8 plots the frequency
of contracts during the year, at a monthly and weekly frequency17 . The most notable
17 The

use of both time frequencies is necessary, as only the month of the contract is
recorded in data prior to the CICA in 1984.
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feature of this image is the year end rush to sign contracts. ? cites this characteristic
of all federal contracts for the fiscal years 2004 through 2009, describing a frequency
during the last week of the fiscal year that is more than 4 times higher than through
the rest of the year. The end of year rush is also evident in this longer dataset,
particularly in the weekly frequency data. ? suggests that this is in large part the
result of “use it or lose it” type budgets, where unspent funds in one year may prove
more difficult to garner the following year.
To better analyze the seasonality in contracts, observations prior to fiscal year
1984 are omitted to display the data in figure 1.9 in a weekly frequency. Here several
statistics beyond the frequency are displayed, with several notable patterns in the
data. When inspecting the weekly frequency from figure 1.8 and the total, mean
and median values across weeks in figure 1.9, a large spike in both dollar value and
number of contracts signed at the end of each quarter is clear, and to a lesser extent
at the end of each month. While the end of the fiscal calendar yields the largest
spike across statistics and is most likely driven by the contracting offices, the smaller
spikes in quarter and month end spending are most likely driven by the individual
contractors and standard business practices. These constraints most likely include the
delivery of earnings reports, accounting deadlines, and project timetables, all of which
traditionally exhibit the periodicity exemplified here, which results from operating
on a monthly or quarterly planning horizon. Many government contractors are small
private firms solely devoted to governmental work where quarterly earnings reports
and third party commercial interests are not as much a concern. However a great deal
of government contract work is performed by large, publicly traded firms with a great
deal of commercial work outside of contracts, such as Boeing or General Electric.
It is likely that various project teams at these firms work on timetables dictated by
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corporate policy, and these timetables would drive the quarter and month end spike
in both contract size and frequency.
The seasonality is an important aspect of the data, which could help motivate
sub-annual dynamic aspects of the data. In certain applications it could also be a
source of spurious results, particularly in microeconomic studies. The estimations in
the present study will directly control for the year end rush of contract signing and
estimate the impact that this timing has on contract dollars.

Duration Analysis
The duration of a contract is another time dimension which can impact subsequent
analysis. Consider a research problem that is looking at the economic impact of a
shock resulting from a quick shift in DoD mission. By including long-term contracts
that do not include financing options means that the contractor is paid long after the
contract signing, and the actual impact of those dollars may not directly correspond
to the sign date which could conflate one’s results. Alternatively including long term
contracts and accounting for the duration of these contracts in the presence of short
ones can help elucidate the relationship that length of time plays with contract dollar
awards.
The bulk of these observations contain both the initial and terminal dates of
each contract
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. Table 1.9 contains statistics for various levels of contract length.

Contracts with a negative duration account for modifications to past contracts, where
the final date of the contract may precede the signed date of the modifying action by
many years. Also, contracts that extend for multiple years can be for goods or services
and are typically large enough to find major cost benefits from economies of scale.
18 By

bulk we mean excluding the observations from the FY 1984 - FY 1988 files, where
the information is largely missing
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A simple one way ANOVA test confirms that there is a highly significant, statistical
difference in the mean spending across these levels of contract duration, suggesting
that considerations should be taken to account for duration of those contracts.

1.3.4

Defense Contracting Across States

Military contracting exhibits significant geographic concentration for a number of
political and economic reasons. To provide context to this statement see figure 1.10,
which illustrates this geographic concentration as averaged across each of four different
decades. As illustrated here, very few states experience sustained concentration of
contract awards, namely California and for more recent years and to a lesser extent
Texas and Virginia. Figure 1.11 offers more granular exposition of this trend across
all states, and tells a similar story; relatively few states receive a large amount of
spending compared to most of the others.
Considering the sheer dollar amount of many of these contracts and the substantial
skills involved in manufacture of major systems used by the DoD, this concentration
can be expected as the outcome of rational decision making by contractors. Many
large contractors are able to take advantage of both economies of scale and extensive
procedural knowledge, attributable to a long running history of repeated contract
awards. These large contractors are very likely able to employ their size and expertise
to effectively outbid competitors and garner successive awards.
Beyond the level of competitive pressure exacted by large contractors are industrial
spillovers that can lead to significant agglomeration of smaller defense contractors.
Billions of dollars on an annual basis is more than sufficient market volume to bolster
a significant infrastructural network devoted to military procurements. Considering
the complexity of many of these major systems, the levels of technical skills required
for their development and production would necessitate a labor force of highly trained
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STEM professionals. Concentration of labor in this manner would suggest that subcontracting firms would also locate near these areas, who are devoted to serving prime
contractors, and possibly bidding on prime contracts directly as well.
Spillovers could also be manifested through regional concentration of professional
services designed to serve smaller contractors. These smaller firms may outsource legal, clerical and accounting duties which may require significant specialization geared
to federal contracting19 .
Another component of the geographic concentration may be derived from political
variation across states. It is common practice for regional governments to tailor their
tax policies and regulation to court industries, directly competing with other states
for the benefits of increased business activity and jobs. One can imagine that as part
of a contractor’s optimization decision, regional variations in tax expenses and the
severity of red tape are among the factors considered. A possible example of changes
in political climate is seen in figure 1.11, where it may very well be the case that in
New York the business climate grew inhospitable for contractors, while the opposite
happened in Virginia. However without delving deep into the regional legislative
actions of individual states any political changes will be difficult to fully detail.
National politics play into the geographic dispersion as well. Long serving congressional politicians typically hold committee seats that are responsible for directing
a larger share of federal funding to various projects. Politicians that channel funds to
their home districts in the form of increased federal contracts can gain significant financial support from their constituencies (??). This channel would further strengthen
the degree of regional concentration.
19 For

example, consider cost type contracts typically used on research and development.
Firms must have sufficiently detailed accounting techniques to be awarded such contracts.

26

There is a great deal of military procurement that is not subject to these pressures
of regional concentration. Typically work such as construction or building maintenance services aimed at non-specialized infrastructure, and food or medical supplies
for military bases would fall under this category. There is also the possibility of a multitude of unobservable geographic effects that may play a role. Consider that perhaps
a large contractor is located on the coasts for access to sea ports for their involvement
in non-governmental contracts, or a contractor is located in North Dakota or Texas
for proximity to petroleum resources. The dataset provides the location for the vast
majority of contracts, which allows estimations to employ regional fixed effects which
would control for these long term geographic idiosyncrasies which would otherwise be
inestimable. The impact of regional fixed effects will be included in the estimations
in section 1.4.

1.3.5

Defense Contracting Across Goods and Services

As the largest federal purchaser of goods and services, and because of the sheer size of
the US military and its global missions, the variety of goods and services it procures
is quite large. Some ways to quantify the depth and breadth of this variety is conveniently supplied in the data. Each contract observation contains a four digit Federal
Supply Classification (FSC) code, used by the federal government to categorize that
contract into a subset of services or goods. Inspection of these categories however
suggests that some care should be taken to distinguish between good contracts and
service contracts. The current subsection will present the argument that service categories are too ambiguous and vast to appropriately control for dollar variation across
contracts, by describing these categories in detail.
Distinction between goods and services is common in the field of international
trade since services display unique characteristics, mainly that of task customization
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for each contract20 . Firstly consider the significant customization required for most
service contracts. Unlike goods, a service entails a level of specificity to any single
job that is often not directly translatable to a separate service contract. Service customization makes categorization of services inherently difficult and somewhat broad
based. Consider FSC category R425, engineering technical services, and the scope
of professional services that may fall under this umbrella. Each contract under the
engineering technical services classification will require some specialized tailoring of
skills, expertise, resources and most importantly cost, that is unique to the job at
hand. The same thought experiment can be made for most, if not all of the various
FSC categories, from custodial services (S201) to demolition of buildings (P400). The
extent of specific customization is especially true for various research and development projects, where even a single FSC designation fails to provide a great deal of
insights into the cost and final values of a contract from the uncertainties inherent
in research. Certainly analogous arguments can be made for various goods categories
but in terms of degrees, services are far more precisely tailored to task at hand and
far less fungible across contracts than are goods.
To better quantify this, the data are split into goods contracts and service contracts, and ANOVA results are listed in table 1.10. This table provides the estimation
results from different subsets of the data; pooled FSC codes, then services alone and
finally goods alone. After the implementation of the CICA the FSC codes for services were drastically changed while codes for goods were not, therefore the first three
groupings contain data post 1984 eliminating this structural inconsistency, and as a
comparison results for the full time dataset only containing goods contracts is listed
20 Specifically

? and ? both speak to how customization for each recipient can provide a
wedge between modeling services trade and goods trade which typically do not require the
degree of specificity.
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in the last grouping21 . It is not possible to compare the goods and services directly
in the traditional ANOVA model building framework since they represent different
samples of data. However the inclusion of the pooled sample provides a reference
to judge the fit of either subset. When we consider the one-way ANOVA results of
utilizing only the FSC fixed effects on contract dollars, we see that there is a modest
fit for each model, with the strongest fit via R̄2 captured by the pooled regression.
However when accounting for time and State effects as well, the fit of the model using
goods only data is markedly improved, yielding the highest R̄2 . Furthermore when
compared with the pooled data, isolating only service contracts yields a relative reduction in model fit. Furthermore, when comparing subsets, goods contracts provide
the smallest root mean squared error when comparing similar model structures.
It is in the context of service customization that it would be advisable to make the
distinction between which set of contracts are analyzed. In all of these regressions,
the unrestricted ANOVA suggests that the major portion of the explanatory power
of the model is derived from the annual-time effects. While obviously accounting for
aggregate level effects such as federal fiscal and monetary policy, these annual-time
effects are also capturing changes in the goals and mission of the DoD, which in
turn impacts the types of contracts sought. In the absence of time fixed effects, the
explanatory power derived from changes in mission policy on contract prices may be
incorrectly attributed to a contract FSC group attribute.
For example consider a policy shifting from large scale ground incursions to targeted air strikes. Such a change to policy may result in a shift in the procurement
of fixed wing piloted aircraft towards smaller unmanned drones. Or consider a shift
21 In

1984 there are around 1100 service code categories that were either recategorized
or dropped, and the mapping of codes across this year is unknown. If we included the
earlier time points and count them as entirely separate groups in the first two ANOVA sets
the results are relatively unchanged, with the R̄2 values only slightly higher and the other
results relatively static.
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from research and development on fossil energy to renewable energies, in order to
reduce vulnerability to energy shocks. In either of these scenarios, if time effects are
excluded, reduced demand for any given set of goods will decrease the price and this
channel will not be captured, but good effects will errantly explain more variation of
the model which is actually attributable to mission changes. Ignoring annual shifts
in policy (captured by time effects) will emphasize the effect that contract categories
(captured FSC effects) have on contract dollars.
While all variables in the models listed in table 1.10 are significant

22

use of the

unrestricted model with all three fixed effects groups shows to a large extent different
impacts to the overall model fit depending on the subset of FSC codes used. In
the goods subset, it appears that the time effects have the largest impact on model
fit, capturing these aggregate level shifts in policy and mission goals. Beyond the
time effects, the goods specific FSC codes seems to improve the fit even more. The
improved fit of goods effects suggests that FSC categories for goods more accurately
account for differences in the prices across contracts.
The opposite is true for services however. Here the changes to various mission
goals and other aggregate level effects produce a reduction in model fit of an impact
on contract dollars, while the type of job or services rendered captures more variation
towards the final contract obligation, when compared with goods. Again this inability
for time effects to explain as large a portion of the variation most likely follows
from the original suggestions of the customization necessary for each service contract.
Overall however it is clear that the fit is significantly worse among these contracts.
Another explanation for this gap between the model fit of goods versus service
contracts can be determined by the connection between price and the unobserved
22 An

F-test shows that each factor variable is highly significant at the 0.1 percent level,
across all regressions.
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quantity. One of the limitations of this dataset is the lack of information on specific
quantities contracted. The impact that quantity can play on the resulting contract
price for goods is obvious, while it is a bit more ambiguous for services. Considering
that we do not directly observe the quantity of contracted goods, including time fixed
effects helps to control for the aggregate shifts in prices, affording the model better
fit and less variance accountable to the unobservable elements in the error term. In
an observation where the contract is for fixed wing aircraft in the year 1989 and the
final contract price is known, the number of fixed wing aircrafts can be more easily
inferred.
When considering service contracts, the notion of quantity is not as translatable.
Quantity for service contracts encompasses a range of details that affect the final
contract price; from labor hours, contractor expertise, size of the job, etc. It is this
multitude of factors that yields time effects that are not as powerful in explaining
the variation in the model when compared with goods contracts. In an analogous
example, a contract for engineering technical services in the year 1989 and having
access to the price and location of the contract, the unobservable quantity variable is
not as easily inferred. These unobservable aspects imply a lack of clarity on a host
of details that are fundamental in explaining the final price, and will leave a much
larger piece of the puzzle hidden. The inability to directly observe quantity in this
sense will therefore impact models of goods contracts less so than models of service
contracts.
To provide more illumination of the FSC categories, table 1.11 lists the top five
goods and top five services by three different measures. Glancing across these categories it is evident that service categories are inherently more ambiguous than the
goods categories. The ambiguity is typical across all FSC codes, beyond the few
categories listed here. Looking at goods alone, this dataset contains upwards of 684
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different goods classification while service categories take up almost three times as
many groupings, with 2376 different classification categories. Beyond this difference
in the variety of categories, consider also that more than half of all listed service codes
designate research and development (RDTE) activities. Further splitting the services
into RDTE and other services allows no improvement in model fit, where the RTDE
only subset provides the poorest fit yet23 .
It is this ambiguity coupled with the relative vastness of service FSC codes which
makes service fixed effects rather poor at capturing the variation in contract dollars.
The remaining estimations in this study will use only the goods FSC codes as a control
for unobservable effects. There are practical benefits to the restriction to goods
contracts beyond the improved model estimation fit and theoretical issues. Unlike
service codes, FSC goods codes are aggregable from their native four digit identifier up
to a two digit identifier. The ability to aggregate the codes proves extremely beneficial
to this study by providing tractability, allowing the use of fixed effect interactions
between these aggregated codes in a manner that can still be computed. As stated
above there are more than 600 different categories for analysis, when coupled with
State or year interaction terms, the estimation can have upwards of 30,000 variables.
At the two digit level, our goods codes are restricted to just over 80 categories, greatly
improving the tractability of computations and resulting estimates on interaction
terms. The estimations in the next section will actively address this difference in
identification. There is certainly room for inspection of service contracts in a more
direct way, but that analysis is outside the scope of this study.
23 While

omitted from table 1.10 for brevity, the model R̄2 is as low as .14 or .16 for only
RDTE coded contracts, for the analogous restricted and unrestricted models as listed in
table 1.10.
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1.4

Estimation Analysis

The variables and fixed effects included in the estimates in this section are largely
motivated through the distributional analysis in the preceding one. Considering the
multiplicity of unobservable factors that affect the dollar obligation of a single contract, this study will employ a variety of fixed effects with the hope of controlling a
significant proportion of the variation; specifically time, state, and good level fixed
effects and various interactions of these terms. These regressions will be variations
on the following models:
cg,s,t,i = γg + σs + τt + x0i β + i

(1.1)

cg,s,t,i = γg + σs + τt + (σs × τt ) + x0i β + i

(1.2)

cg,s,t,i = γg + σs + τt + (γg × τt ) + x0i β + i

(1.3)

cg,s,t,i = γg + σs + τt + (γg × σs ) + x0i β + i

(1.4)

Here cg,s,t,i represents the natural log transformed dollar obligation for the ith contract
belonging to the g th FSC demarcated goods category, procured in the sth State during
the tth calendar year. xi is a vector of covariates describing contract characteristics.
These covariates will provide telling results, and shed some light on the influence
of the contracting process on dollar obligation. Among the included variables is:
information about the financing, type, competition extent, and duration, among other
factors. The estimated effects of these characteristics on contract dollars suggest
aspects of the process to look towards for cost reduction and efficiency gains. At
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the very least these estimates provide more elucidation of the contributing factors to
dollar obligations24 .
Each of these regressions has fixed effects that capture different unobservable
phenomenon. Equation 1.1 captures only fixed effects for goods, states and years
separately with no interaction terms. Equation 1.2 adds interaction at the state-year
fixed point which can capture idiosyncratic changes in State laws and fluctuations
in State specific prices. Equation 1.3 captures good-year effects which can account
for technological innovations in a specific product line’s production across time and
mission shifts that asymmetrically affect different procurement categories. Finally
equation 1.4 captures good-State fixed effects, which can include any regional effects
on goods caused by regional resources or localized trade concerns.
As mentioned in the preceding section, to improve the tractability of the computation the aggregated two digit product id FSC codes are used for equation 1.3 and
1.4, while the untransformed four digit codes are used for models 1.1 and 1.2 as these
models yield relatively low variable counts. For consistency of comparisons however,
models 1.1 and 1.2 are additionally estimated with the two digit codes, and listed
in the table as model (1-2) and (2-2) respectively, resulting in six distinct estimates.
Therefore the differences across each of these model specifications lies first in the
choice of which unobservable fixed effects interaction terms are included, and second
in the level of aggregation of the product identification codes.
These estimations will be carried out on the subset of data that corresponds to
goods contracts only. From the analysis in the previous sections, there are clear
distinctions between contracted goods and services. Solely estimating goods allows
24 These

variables are mostly factor variables, and precisely describe: the type of contract,
type of financing if applicable, extent of pre-award competition, whether the contract was
for a weapon, whether cost or pricing data was required by the contracting officer, if it was
a multi-year contract, if it was signed in the last month of the fiscal year, and finally a
natural log transformed count of the months of contract duration.
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us to focus on several benefits. First service customization described in the previous
section does not lend itself readily to a discussion of prescriptive goals for improving
contract costs. As a result of this customization, the streamlining of services must be
dealt with on a case-by-case basis unlike that of goods. There are also more practical
benefits of higher degrees of freedom and a more parsimonious model than if all FSC
codes were included. Finally focusing on goods contracts alone yields estimates with
a better model fit compared with the unrestricted model, which helps to strengthen
the following arguments.
From the information in the previous sections, it should be no surprise that the
nature of these data are unbalanced, where some good-state-year units contain many
more observations relative to others. Fortunately the goal of including the fixed effects
is not to utilize point estimates for the analysis of any particular sub-group, but to
control for the otherwise unobservable influences, allowing more focus on regressors
that belong in vector xi .
Finally several model specification decisions will further subset the data. By log
transforming the data we eliminate any of the negative dollar observations, which
originally resulted from contract modifications or deobligations. This transformation
provides more estimate consistency across various specifications and better comparability of the resulting estimates. Furthermore some covariates contained within the
vector xi are not recorded for the entire 45 years of the time span. Many of these
characteristic regressors are not recorded until the CICA act and following few years,
such as financing information. Also the modernization that was completed in the
fiscal year 2007 data files drops the weapon identifier in records. These specification
decisions result in estimates over the time span of 1987-2006.
Fortunately many of the structural issues discussed in section 1.3, such as changes
in record keeping and legislation that alter the nature of the data, occur predomi-
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nantly outside this timespan, which renders an otherwise important estimation issue
moot. This is a significant benefit of the given model specification.

1.4.1

Baseline estimates

The results from the estimations described above are contained in tables 1.12 - 1.16.
Each of these tables represents estimates from the same six model specifications;
1.1 - 1.4 plus the aggregate good code versions of 1.1 and 1.2 (listed as 1-2 and 22 in these tables). Looking across these results, It quickly becomes clear that the
estimates are relatively robust to changes in the model specifications: the estimates
typically produce a coefficient of determination around between .51 and .48, with
similar decomposition of variance measures across models, and comparable β̂ point
estimates for the observable covariates.
In order to see the collective influence of various groups of fixed effects and regressors in these estimations, a series of decompositions of variances are calculated
on the estimated coefficients, as employed in ?. A decomposition of variance in this
regard will inform us to the proportion of variation attributed to each set of regressors, suggesting which components are most powerful in explaining dollar variations
across contracts. Furthermore, as described above, the unbalanced nature of data
with respect to the fixed effects makes inference from individual fixed effect estimates
difficult in the least, and suspect at best. However grouping all fixed effects into their
respective categories and measuring the variance contribution of each group provides
information about the general impact of these groups.
The results of this calculation are listed in table 1.12, with the covariance listed
in the first row for each model specification and the respective percent of overall
variance listed underneath. It is clear that regardless of the model specification, the
bulk of the variation in contract dollar obligations is accounted for by annual time
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fixed effects. As previously mentioned, these effects capture annual global shocks
that impact contract spending. Among the multitude of shocks that may influence
contracts in this regard, national political shifts and changes in the Defense Department’s mission are likely causes of much of this influence. Furthermore, State fixed
effects seem to capture the least amount of variation in dollar obligations, suggesting
that individual State idiosyncrasies, as well as general agglomeration effects has the
least influence on contract dollar as far as can be estimated here. These results should
be rather intuitive, primarily since it is the federal government who is choosing what
to contract and with whom to do it, while States have at best a tertiary influence
on these award decisions, after the decisions of the government and contractors are
made. While there may be some benefit provided of a geographic critical mass of
contractors, it is evident that these effects are greatly smaller than any direct change
in national politics that would impact foreign policy, defense policy, or otherwise.
Goods fixed effects and interaction effects also seem to explain relatively little
contract dollar variation. Using the less aggregated (4-digit) version of the FSC
goods codes increases the proportion of variation captured in the regression, effectively
doubling the proportion of explained variation by these effects, however at 8.3 percent,
it is still relatively low. The low level of explained variation suggests that unobservable
factors across goods categories do not play a substantial role in the determination of
prices. The relatively low value is likely a consequence of the lack of information
in this data set on quantities ordered of these goods categories. If information on
quantity was coupled with the price data we have, the result may be an increase the
variance captured by goods fixed effects. If one solely focuses on the interaction of
fixed effects, good-year effects seem to capture the greatest amount of variation in
dollar obligations. These effects most directly capture the changes over time in one
good category versus another. These shifts can arise from annual changes that affect
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only individual categories like reduction or increases in the reliance of ground forces
and the kit they require. It also captures good specific price shocks, or sub-aggregate
inflation changes. In total however, all interaction terms seem to at best explain only
very little of the variation across contract obligations, with good-State interactions
accounting for just over 2 percent being the high end.
After annual fixed effects, the second best group of variables that captures contract
dollar variation are the observable characteristics for each contract, specifically the
variables in vector xi . Across all model specifications, collectively these characteristic
variables explain around 15 percent of the total variation in contract price. The
next subsections will look at these variables in more depth. It should also be noted
that across all model specifications, the estimated effects of these characteristics are
generally highly consistent, with typically large and significant effects on average
contract prices. Furthermore these factors are the most controllable by individual
contracting officers and offer the most direct way to alter the procurement process
for the better.

1.4.2

Contract Structures and Cost Types

As earlier stated, contracts can fall into one of two broad based categories, fixedprice type or cost type, and the general distinction between the two is the burden
of risk across parties. Table 1.13 displays the point estimates from all six model
specifications. These estimates are produced by comparing various types with the
base type: firm-fixed price contracts. Firm-fixed price contracts account for the vast
majority of contracts signed by the federal government, and are perhaps also the
“safest” for the taxpayer, as they effectively shift all risk onto the contractor. Any
variation on these fixed price contracts include some room for risk-sharing, displacing
some level of risk back to taxpayers through various sub-types to redetermine final
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payment or incentivize contractor performance. Intuition would dictate that this risk
translates directly to higher prices for contracts, and this logic is borne out in the
results, where all of the the riskier (from the perspective of the taxpayer) contracts
increase the average price of the resulting contract to some degree.
Economic adjustment clauses to fixed-price contracts listed under the categories A
and K in table 1.13 do not seem to increase contract price dramatically over firm fixed
price contracts, with redetermination leading typically to a contract cost increase of
5 percent or so, while escalations leading to somewhere between a 16 and 22 percent
rise in the average cost. It is likely that these contracts have a significant pool of
information at the time of the contract award and these adjustments are minimal at
most. Inclusion of performance and award fees however has significantly more upward
pressure on the price of a contract. Performance incentives increase price somewhere
between 55 and 72 percent, while award fees more than double costs over the basic
firm-fixed price option, with estimates between 108 and 145 percent average increase.
The increase in cost is the direct consequence of the option for fee payment above
and beyond the contracted items, and most likely is capturing the typical cost of the
fee itself.
Cost type contracts shift the bulk of the risk over to taxpayers, and we should
expect that these contracts may cost even more than fixed price type contracts. The
increase in average dollar obligation is apparent, as cost contracts can increase the
average price of the contract anywhere from 120-145 percent for cost type plus a fixed
fee, to between 380-470 percent for cost type plus incentive fee contract. Remember
that these types of contracts are not the preference of the government as there is less
incentive for contractors to keep costs down when compared with fixed price contracts.
Also as a subset of cost contracts, time and materials and labor hour contracts do
not seem to follow this pattern of displaying a many fold increase in price above our
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base group. These two subcategories are targeted at two direct types of costs, and
only present an increase over firm fixed price contracts of 29 to 42 percent for either
category. The relative inexpensive of these two cost contracts is most likely the result
of transparent monitoring of these types of costs, which are typically easy to account
for.
Cost contracts are typically used as a second best option for the government.
They are a tool for bringing in increased diversity of sources or improved quality
of procurement for projects that would otherwise be deemed too risky by smaller
contractors. These typically can involve significant research for a specific new systems
or long term horizons with volatile inputs. As stated in section 1.3.1, cost type
contracts are not the norm, but far from uncommon and require heightened scrutiny
to the accounting practices of the contractor engaged in such a contract. The required
accounting transparency is aimed at reducing the inherent moral hazard with cost
contracts. Award fees are used to provide additional incentives to contractors to keep
costs down and maintain efficiency, by providing them a payment above and beyond
the costs of the project and promote quality effort.
In order to evaluate the effectiveness of these types of contracts however additional
information is needed. It is clear that firm-fixed price contracts are by far the least
expensive option for the government. Whether there should be moves to increase
fixed price contracts over cost type contracts is where the balance between mission
objectives and economic efficiency must be weighed. Of particular interest would be
some measure of contract outcomes, be that quality or otherwise, where some more
empirical judgment calls could be made with this trade off.
One can draw a few suggestions from these estimates however. Additional fees
written into contracts, be they award, incentive, or performance fees, seem to drastically increase the contract obligation, regardless of whether that contract is fixed

40

price type or cost type. There is undoubtedly room for further inspection of these
fees, both their stated purposes and measured effectiveness, to help quantify the net
benefits to these higher prices. The relatively low increase in costs associated with
labor or material costs contracts may provide insights that translate to other cost
contracts. There may be room within cost contracts generally to have a narrower
definition of covered costs in aims to reduce the overall price gap between cost and
fixed price contracts. Overall, while the sign of these effects is intuitive, the magnitude should give readers pause. To better evaluate and quantify efficacy of the
tools that the government uses to promote diversity and contract quality, data on the
outcomes of these contracts would greatly benefit future studies.

1.4.3

Finance options available for Contracts

Contract financing is a tool available to the contracting officer to promote high quality
contracts and competition, making competitive bids by smaller contractors possible
by providing them some degree of prepayment for the contract. As with all tools, if
its goal is to increase competition and quality then its efficacy should be quantified
and measured. The coefficient estimates for different finance levels are listed in table
1.14. For comparison, the base level that these coefficients are measured against are
contracts with no financing. Therefore these estimates directly compute the average
cost of different forms of financing. The most notable finding is that regardless of the
form it takes, financing seems to increase contract price.
When contract financing is used, the preferred method is performance based financing where disbursements are predicated on a set of clear, objective and quantifiable goals for the contractor to meet. Performance based financing is perceived to
be the least risky to enter into from the government’s perspective, where the key is
the completion of these goals, unlike other financing terms which rely on less tangible
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benchmarks for payment disbursements. Progress payments determined by costs (A
in table 1.14) or a percentage of contract completion (C in table 1.14) are next in the
government’s preference hierarchy. Least preferred are advanced payments or otherwise unusual progress payment, and the FAR has rather strong language to dissuade
contracting officers from writing contracts with such financing terms25 , as an effort
to reduce risk exposure to the government.
Unusually however, the ranking of most to least expensive estimated average cost
of financing listed in table 1.14 is the reverse of this preference ordering. Starting
with the most expensive category, performance-based contracts account for an average increase in contract prices in the range of 280 to 390 percent over non-financed
contracts26 . The pattern continues with progress payments and percentage of completion progress payments, presenting increases in contract dollars in the range of
100 to 115 percent and 74 to 96 percent respectively. Finally, unusual progress payments/advanced payments account for the least expensive set of traditional financing,
yielding an increase in the range of 62-111 percent.
So while there is greater risk involved in advanced-payment or unusual-progresspayment financing they tend to produce cheaper contracts than their relatively less
risky counterparts. Perhaps the reduction in average costs is associated with the increased scrutiny these least preferred contracts receive; where greater pressure on the
terms of these financing yields lower average dollar obligations. Another cause may
be the general reluctance of contracting officers to write higher priced contracts with
25 The

FAR states that progress payments must be up to and less than 80 percent (85
percent for small business concerns) of the total cost of performing the contract. Financing
outside of these terms would constitute an unusual progress payment (FAR 32.501-1).
26 It

should be noted that the two estimates at the low end of this range are derived from
the two models that utilize the four digit FSC code, translating to greater refinement of the
good fixed effects and most likely attenuating the estimate a significant amount. With that
in mind however the effects are still far from what one would consider small.
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these risky forms of finance in the first place. If in fact the driving force in the price
disparity is the increased government pressure and scrutiny, then there is the potential for benefit in translating these practices to other types of financing. Alternatively
if the source of this cost wedge is reluctance on the part of the contracting officer,
the scope for application of similar protocol is significantly less. Which of these two
cases is the driving force is unobservable from the data and FAR protocol alone,
where quantifiable data on competition outcomes would greatly help to understand
the forces driving this pattern. Information on outcomes is unfortunately outside
the scope of this study, but it suggests fruitful places to search for more prescriptive
recommendations to contracting efficiency gains.
Another noteworthy result from these findings is the relatively low increase from
commercial financing. Commercial financing is specifically financing provided by the
government for commercial goods, and occurs in industries where some level of financing provided by the buyer is common. The increase in contract price associated
with this form of financing relative to no financing is estimated at between 11 and 19
percent. The very fact that these items are provided in a commercial market, where
the federal government is entering as an (albeit potentially large) buyer, provides
a framework of price competition in terms of market pressures and infrastructures
outside the typical federal contracting parameters. Existing market structures allow
clearly defined rates and competitive pressures to facilitate lower prices over all. The
majority of contracts with financing terms are for non-commercial items, which do
not have a market outside of government monopsony and limited competition to help
put downward pressure on costs. Commercial items however experience market forces
that are more competitive than their non-commercial counterparts. Also in industries
where buyer financing is a common practice, the terms of financing are more standardized and also receive competitive pressures by the market forces. Contracting
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officers are instructed to incorporate market-competitive terms into the contract on
the basis of market research, and when financing is practiced outside federal contracting research is easily gathered. These factors combine to yield significantly less
expensive contracts when commercial financing is deployed when compared with the
standard financing described in the preceding paragraphs.

1.4.4

Extent of Competition in Contract Bidding

The entire contracting process is predicated on the notion that the award of contracts
is determined by a competitive process of either sealed-bidding or open proposals.
Suboptimal procedures based on less than full and open competition may be pursued
for any number of reasons, ranging from national security risks to a lack of reliable
contractors for any given contract. The entire FAR is written in a tone directed at
increasing competition for all circumstances, particularly when a contract bidding is
less than fully competitive. Therefore as stated in section 1.3.1, the bulk of the FAR
and associated legislation on contracting is written to guide less than fully competitive
situations in an effort towards increased fairness.
The information in the estimation window on extent of competition for each contract is somewhat imprecise, yielding only four levels of competition. Full and open
competition corresponds to our base level, while follow on competition corresponds
to a continuing action that, while not competed in its particular signing, follows a
previous contract that was awarded under competitive procedures. “Not available for
competition” represents a subset of the “not competed” category, where the availability for competition is dictated by federal law (10 U.S.C §2034).
One would expect that reduced competition should increase prices, which is generally the story told in table 1.15. The impact on prices is an increase in the range
of under one and up to 16 percent in average price over full and open competition.
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It is worth noting that the two model specification types that use the native 4 digit
FSC product codes produce negative coefficient estimates for the not available and
follow on competition classifications. The existence of a specification inconsistency
does not occur for the larger, more general category of not competed, where the estimates are consistently positive across the board. As all estimates are significant, the
change in sign depending on model specification should cause concern, particularly
when compared the the strong and reinforcing results associated with financing and
contract type. The notion that more competition will reduce costs is a fundamental
notion in economics. The relatively small impact of these results is surprising, and
coupled with the specification issues makes uncertain how influential competition is
in determining the final contract dollar amount.
As previously mentioned the President and various policy makers have stressed
the promotion of competition as the sole best method for reducing federal contracting costs. It is often the sole method mentioned among politicians and the media
for reducing costs. These estimates suggest that perhaps increasing competition is
not as powerful a tool in lowering contract costs as those politicians would have us
believe. There is something to say for the political draw of promoting competition.
Average constituents easily identify with the principles of competition as it is clear
and intuitive. The estimates in this section suggest that slight alterations on the
administrative end of procurement through bureaucratic process modifications may
be more powerful to reduce costs than competition alone.

1.4.5

Role of Signing Date and Duration

As previously stated, the timing of a contract can significantly influence its price.
The annual fixed effects in each regression have already been shown to capture a
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large portion of the variation in each regression. Listed in table 1.16 are the effects
various time dimensions have on contract dollar amount.

Multi-Year Contracts
Multi year contracts are contracts written with an expectation on the outset for the
government to procure and the contractor to produce a good beyond one year. The
FAR advises against writing multi-year contracts, in favor of single year contracts,
with options to extend the original contract. As with the majority of the FAR, the
reasoning behind advising against these contracts is to protect the government against
the possibility of unforeseen volatility in future years and other unknown risks, which
can lead to increases in costs. If however signing a multi-year contract improves
supply chains for future needs, produces long term cost savings, has expectations
that the needs and budgets for the product extend into the foreseeable future, and
has a low expectation of risk, then it is considered a useful tool for contracting officers.
Unfortunately little can be said from the estimates in this study, as the effects
of multi-year contracts on dollar obligations seems to be strongly influenced by the
model specification. While some estimates suggest a cost savings of around 11 percent
through the use of multi-year contracts, other models suggest between a 6 and 12
percent increase in average contract cost27 . These inconclusive results make it difficult
to draw conclusive results about the relative expense of multi-year options or its
effectiveness as a tool for the government.
27 Again

the estimates seem dependent upon whether two digit or four digit goods fixed
effects are used, and as such unreliable for inference.
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Year End Rush
A symptom of the annual budgeting process at any institution is a reluctance to spend
early followed by a rush to spend towards the end of the budget cycle, in order to
consume all appropriated funds. The reasoning behind this is a fear of the loss of unused funds for the next budget cycle. The fear of lost funds is understandable when
the parties involved in setting budgets are not those directly involved in awarding
funds and administering projects, which is the case for the DoD and congressionally
approved budgets. Often times the year end rush to spend results in less efficiently
allocated dollars and wasteful spending on projects that would otherwise be considered unnecessary or of low quality. ? describe both the increase in cost and the drop
in quality involved in contracts signed in this regard, using federal I.T. projects.
Displayed in table 1.16 is the dollar impact of a contract that was signed in the last
month of the fiscal year, which for the estimation period is September. Regardless of
model specification, there is a very clear increase in average contract price of around
12 percent over contracts that are signed in any other month of the year. These
findings are in line with those of ?, and also consistent with the trend indicated in
table 1.8. One reasonable and demonstrably effective solution to this problem is to
allow a portion of remaining budgets to rollover into the next fiscal year28 . However
as with most solutions that make economic sense, they may appear counterintuitive
with only cursory analysis, and subject to significant political pressures in search of
budgetary savings. It is hard to convince policy makers that allowing institutions
to keep unused budgets will actually lead to better outcomes and long run savings.
If these budget policies are enacted safeguards must couple them to stand against
political whims.
28 This

scenario is described in ?, where the Department of Justice is allowed to keep a
portion of unused budgets at years end to roll over to the next, which the authors describe
as a successful project at reversing this phenomenon.
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Duration of Contracts
The final column of table 1.16 lists the effects of contract duration on the price of a
contract, and enters the estimates as the natural log transformed measure of duration
months. Right away one can see that regardless of model specification, the estimates
for effects on all very precisely estimated and also very consistent. All estimates
generally suggest that for a ten percent increase in a contracts duration, we can
expect about 4 percent rise in the cost of that contract.
Typical contracts are executed in a relatively short span of time, namely fixed price
contracts to purchase commercial goods where existing supply is present and no need
for an extended manufacturing process. However it is natural to assume that projects
needing longer time projections for completion are very likely complex in nature. For
example, the expectation of contract completion for office supplies for a administrative
needs is quite different than the expectation when contracting for fighter jets. In this
context that duration may be a suitable proxy for measures of contract complexity.
Typically larger programs such as major systems and development of new weapon
technology will require both longer time commitments and greater dollar amounts to
fund them over the contract duration. Looking back to table 1.9 it is clear that the
highest mean contract value occurs in contracts which take two years to complete.
Inspecting the report ?, all major systems listed require significant amounts of time
to completion, which can be compounded by delays in implementation and delays
delivery of capabilities29 .
Unfortunately determining the source of causality is impossible in the estimation
of this effect. It is intuitive that one would expect that a longer contract would most
likely lead to larger expenses, but whether to use restriction of contract duration
29 In

?, the ten largest programs with cost overruns are all still in the production phase.
At the reports publication, the newest program was two years old, while the oldest was 18
years old.
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as a prescription for reducing contract costs seems unwise. Currently the FAR and
federal legislation dictate that multi-year contracts not extend beyond 5 years, of
course with exceptions. There are situations that would benefit longer contracts,
particularly those requiring study and analysis for the overall best implementation of
certain systems and projects. More analysis is required before knowing if suggestions
to curb contract duration with the aim of reducing costs would actually be effective
and not counter productive. As has been a common refrain throughout this section,
there is no question that information on contract outcomes that could be coupled
with this data would be necessary to even begin to answer this question.

1.5

Concluding Remarks

For many decades, military spending has accounted for a very large share of the U.S.
federal government budget appropriations. Furthermore if one only considers federal
contracting, the portion accounted for by the DoD is by far the largest. Scholars have
used total military spending by the government to estimate a variety of fiscal policy
questions, with only cursory scrutiny of procurement spending. In depth analysis of
contracting the was the very goal of the current essay, using a vast pool of data on
individual contracts as the source of this information, instead of relying on aggregated
data and anecdotal reports. These preceding analyses were all in the hope of providing some insight into which aspects of the procurement process provide the driving
force behind ultimate contract dollar obligations, and to what extent. In addition
to studying aspects of the contracting process that drive costs, the present study
attempts to paint a vignette of the history of contracting for the past five decades,
looking at contracting across the dimensions of time, geography, and sectors.
In the present political-economic environment surrounding defense spending, better understanding of which factors may contribute to the costs associated with con-
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tracting may provide insight into how to squeeze efficiency out of procurements that
would otherwise remain unseen. One interesting finding counters conventional wisdom
regarding promoting competition, which is typically described as a great equalizer.
Recent directives from the President to increase competition added to the forced budgetary cuts from sequestration have further increased the push for greater competition
in contracting. The results in this study show that while increasing competition seems
to reduce the actual contract cost, the impact is relatively small and not always guaranteed. Furthermore, other aspects of the contracting process may be vastly more
promising to reduce dollar obligations, appearing to be significantly more influential
on contract cost competition. The current study raises the issues that a more holistic
and nuanced approach, with a combination of competition promotion and addressing
contract signing procedures may provide the most benefit. At the very least it suggests that aspects of the process, outside of competition alone, need more attention
and analysis. Alterations in the application of contract financing and assignment of
contract type assignment may hold the key to significant cost savings.
Furthermore, it has been shown that the single largest source of variation in
contract dollars comes from annual aggregate shocks, embodied by political shifts,
military actions, and geopolitical events. These shocks account for roughly 20-25
percent of variation in an individual contract’s dollar obligation. This suggests that
the BCA of 2011 will have profound effects on the dollars that individual contracts
receive. Since the sequestration is intentionally ham-fisted in its cutting approach,
there is no scope for changing allocations across departments and programs in the
DoD’s portfolio, making these cuts even more painful. With no repeal of the BCA in
sight, studies such as this one are even more valuable. Since the DoD cannot control
the dispersion of cuts, perhaps changing the way contracts are written can provide
some room to alleviate the impact on the DoD’s mission. This study has shown
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which tools are relatively expensive in the procurement process, highlighting areas
that should be further analyzed.
As was clear throughout section 1.4, a primary goal of future work should be
aims at isolating and quantifying the outcomes of contracts. One aspect missing
in this study is a direct measure of outcomes, be they quality of contracts, costs
overruns, or delays in delivery. Here it is clear that cost contracts and financing of
contracts are associated with higher costs, but if these costs provide better quality
contracts ultimately these tools may be worth the cost. Incorporating some measure
of a contract outcomes could provide the piece of information to prescribe more direct
and effective solutions for improving the contracting process.
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Sample Form DD-350
INDIVIDUAL CONTRACTING ACTION REPORT
PART
A

A1. TYPE OF REPORT
0 Original 1 Cancelling
2 Correcting

A2. REPORT NO.

A3. CONTRACTING OFFICE
CODE

B2. MODIFICATION, ORDER OR OTHER ID
NUMBER

B1. CONTRACT IDENTIFICATION INFORMATION

PART
B

B1B. ORIGIN OF CONTRACT
A DoD
B NASA
C Other Non-DoD Agency

B1A. CONTRACT NUMBER

REPORT CONTROL SYMBOL
A4. NAME OF CONTRACTING OFFICE

B3. ACTION
DATE
(YYYYMMDD)

B4. COMPLETION
DATE
(YYYYMMDD)

B5. CONTRACTOR IDENTIFICATION INFORMATION
B5A. CONTRACTOR IDENTIFICATION
NUMBER

B5E. CONTRACTOR ADDRESS (Street, City, State, Zip Code)

B5D. CONTRACTOR NAME AND DIVISION NAME

B5C. CAGE
CODE

B5B. GOVERNMENT
AGENCY
Y Yes
N No
B5F. TIN

B5G. PARENT TIN
B6A. CITY OR PLACE CODE

B6. PRINCIPAL PLACE OF

B5H. PARENT NAME
B6B. STATE OR COUNTRY CODE

B6C. CITY OR PLACE AND STATE OR COUNTRY NAME

PERFORMANCE

1 Obligation
B12. PRINCIPAL
PRODUCT OR
SERVICE

B9. FOREIGN MILITARY
SALE
Y Yes
N No

B8. TOTAL DOLLARS (Enter whole dollars only)

B7. TYPE OBLIGATION
2 Deobligation

B12A. FSC OR SVC
CODE

B12B. DOD CLAIMANT B12C. PROGRAM, SYS- B12D. SIC CODE
PROGRAM CODE
TEM OR EQUIP. CODE
B13B. TYPE OF INDEFINITE DELIVERY
CONTRACT

B13. KIND OF CONTRACTING ACTION
B13A. CONTRACT/ORDER
1 Letter Contract
3 Definitive Contract
4 Order under an Agreement
5 Order under Indefinite Delivery
Contract (IDC)
6 Order/Call under Federal Schedule
8 Order from Procurement List
9 Purchase Order/Call

A Requirements Contract
(FAR 52.216-21)
B Indefinite Quantity Contract
(FAR 52.216-22)
C Definite Quantity Contract
(FAR 52.216-20)

C1. SYNOPSIS
A Synopsis Only
B Combined Synopsis/
Solicitation
N No

C2. REASON NOT SYNOPSIZED
A Urgency
B Use of FACNET
Z Other Reason

L Fixed-Price Incentive
R Cost-Plus-Award-Fee
S Cost Contract

C8. SOLICITATION PROCEDURES
A Full & Open Competition - Sealed Bid
B Full & Open Competition - Competitive
Proposal
C Full & Open Competition - Combination
D Architect - Engineer
E Basic Research

F
G
K
M
N

B13C. MULTIPLE/SINGLE AWARD IDC(S)
M Multiple Award

B14. CICA APPLICABILITY

S Single Award

B13D. MODIFICATION
A Additional Work
(new agreement)
B Additional Work (other)
C Funding Action
D Change Order
E Termination for Default

A Pre-CICA
B CICA Applicable
C Simplified Acquisition
Procedures Other than
FAR Subpart 13.6
D Simplified Procedures
Pursuant to FAR
Subpart 13.6

F Termination for
Convenience
G Cancellation
H Exercise of an Option
J Definitization of a Letter
Contract

A Walsh-Healey Act

D Davis-Bacon Act

C Service Contract Act

Z Not Applicable

C13.
FOREIGN
TRADE DATA

A U.S.

U Unknown - No
Response or Provision
Not Included in
Solicitation

C6. NUMBER OF OFFERORS
SOLICITED
1 One
2 More than One

C9. AUTHORITY FOR OTHER THAN FULL & OPEN COMPETITION
1A Unique Source
1F Standardization
1B Follow-on Contract
1G Only One Source - Other
1C Unsolicited Research Prop
2A Urgency
1D Patent/Data Rights
3A Particular Sources
1E Utilities
4A International Agreement

C11. CERTIFIED COST OR
PRICING DATA
Y Yes - Obtained
N No - Not Obtained
W Not Obtained - Waived

C13A. PLACE OF MANUFACTURE

C4. SEA TRANSPORTATION
Y Yes - Positive Response to DFARS
252.247-7022 or 252.212-7000(c)(2)
N No - Negative response to DFARS
252.247-7022 or 252.212-7000(c)(2)

T Cost-Sharing
Y Time-and-Materials
U Cost-Plus-Fixed-Fee
Z Labor-Hour
V Cost-Plus-Incentive-Fee

Multiple Award Schedule
Alternative Sources
Set-Aside
Reserved
Other than Full & Open Competition

C10. SUBJECT TO LABOR STANDARDS STATUTES

C7. NUMBER OF OFFERS
RECEIVED

5A
5B
6A
7A

Authorized by Statute
Authorized Resale
National Security
Public Interest

C12. CONTRACT FINANCING
A FAR 52.232-16
B DFARS 252.232-7003
C Percentage of Completion PP

C13B. COUNTRY OF ORIGIN CODE

D Unusual PP or AP
E Commercial Financing
F Performance-Based Financing

Z Not Applicable

C14. COMMERCIAL ITEMS
Y Yes - FAR 52.212-4 Included

B Foreign

N No - FAR 52.212-4 Not Included

(Do Not Complete This Part If Block B5B is Coded Y, or If Block B13A is Coded 6)

PART D
D1. TYPE OF BUSINESS

L Foreign Concern/Entity
M Domestic Firm Performing Outside U.S.
U Historically Black Colleges and Universities
or Minority Institutions (HBCU/MI)
V Other Educational
Z Other Nonprofit

Small Disadvantaged Business Performing in U.S.
Other Small Business Performing in U.S.
Large Business Performing in U.S.
JWOD Participating Nonprofit Agencies
Hospital

D4.
PREFERENCE
PROGRAM

D4A. TYPE OF SB SET-ASIDE
A None
B Total SB Set-Aside
C Partial SB Set-Aside
E Total SDB Set-Aside
Y Emerging Small Business
Set-Aside

Asian-Indian American
Asian-Pacific American
Black American
Hispanic American

D9. DEMONSTRATION
TEST PROGRAM

D6. WOMEN-OWNED
BUSINESS

E Native American
F Other SDB Certified/
determined by SBA
Z No Representation

D10. SIZE OF SMALL
BUSINESS

Y Yes
N No
E1

E2

D2. REASON NOT AWARDED TO SMALL
DISADVANTAGED BUSINESS (SDB)
A No Known SDB Source
B SDB Not Solicited
C SDB Solicited/No Offer
D SDB Solicited/Offer Not Low
Z Other Reason

D4B. TYPE OF SDB SET-ASIDE/SDB PREFERENCE
A None
E SDB Preferential
B Section 8(a)
Consideration C Total SDB Set-Aside
Partial SB Set-Aside
D SDB Evaluation
F SDB Evaluation
Preference Preference in
Unrestricted
Construction

D5. ETHNIC GROUP

PART E

B12E. NAME/DESCRIPTION

C3. EXTENT COMPETED
A Competed Action
B Not Available for Competition
C Follow-on to Competed Action
D Not Competed

C5. TYPE OF CONTRACT
A Fixed-Price Redetermination
J Firm-Fixed-Price
K Fixed-Price Economic Price Adjustment

A
B
C
D

B11. TOTAL MULTIYEAR VALUE
(Enter whole dollars only)

(Do Not Complete This Part If Block B5B is Coded Y)

PART C

A
B
C
D
F

B10. MULTIYEAR
CONTRACT
Y Yes
N No

Y Yes
N No
U Uncertified

NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES
A
B
C
D

50 or Fewer
51 - 100
101 - 250
251 - 500
E3

E5

F2. SIGNATURE

PART F

DD FORM 350, OCT 1997 (EG)

PREVIOUS EDITION IS OBSOLETE.

D4E.
PREMIUM
PERCENT

A None
B HBCU or MI - Total
Set-Aside
C HBCU or MI - Partial
Set-Aside

D8. SUBCONTRACTING PLAN - SB, SDB, OR HBCU/MI
A Plan Not Included
- No Subcontracting
Possibilities
B Plan Not Required

AVERAGE ANNUAL GROSS REVENUE ($)
M 1,000,000 or Less
S 5,000,001 - 10,000,000
N 1,000,001 - 2,000,000
T 10,000,001 - 17,000,000
P 2,000,001 - 3,500,000
U Over 17,000,000
R 3,500,001 - 5,000,000

E4

F1. NAME OF CONTRACTING OFFICER OR REPRESENTATIVE

D4D. RESERVED

D4C. HBCU/MI SET-ASIDE

D7. SMALL BUSINESS INNOVATION
RESEARCH (SBIR) PROGRAM
A Not a SBIR Program Phase I/II/III
B SBIR Program Phase I Action
C SBIR Program Phase II Action
D SBIR Program Phase III Action
or

E 501 - 750
F 751 - 1,000
G Over 1,000

D3. REASON NOT AWARDED TO
SMALL BUSINESS (SB)
A No Known SB Source
B SB Not Solicited
C SB Solicited/No Offer
D SB Solicited/Offer Not Low
Z Other Reason

E6

E7

C Plan Required, Incentive
Not Included
D Plan Required, Incentive
Included
D11. EMERGING SMALL
BUSINESS
Y Yes
N No
E8

F3. TELEPHONE NO. F4. DATE
(YYYYMMDD)
Designed using Perform Pro, WHS/DIOR, Jun 97

Figure 1.1: This form is used for summarizing individual contract actions above the threshold, for this FY it is 25,000 dollars. This is the contract issued for fiscal year 1998, and
differs slightly from previous and future forms, depending on changes in legislation and
procurement protocol. This copy was chosen for its clarity and compactness; previous years
photo copies lack legibility, and beginning in fiscal year 2001 the form moves to 4 pages.
Written forms for all years can be found at http://siadapp.dmdc.osd.mil/procurement/
Procurement.html.
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Field Entry
199801
97AS
146
013H
Def Pers Spt Ctr (Subsistence)
SP030098D2901
A
289A
19971016
19971016
53945259
53945259
51099661
N
0UUM9
LANKFORD SYSCO FOOD SERVICES,
33239 COSTEN RD
POCOMOKE CITY
MD
21851
62475
47
24
Pocomoke City
Worcester
Maryland
1
65494
N
N
0
8910

Field Name
Product/Service description
DoD claimant program code
Claimant program description
Weapon system code
Weapon system name
SIC
Contract/order
Type indefinite delivery contract
Multiple/single idc
CICA applicability
Synopsis
Extent competed
Sea transportation
Type of contract
Number of offers solicited
Number of offers received
Solicitation procedures
Subject to labor standards statutes
Cost or pricing data
Contract financing
Commercial
Type of business
Reason not awarded to SDB
Reason not awarded to SB
SB set-aside
SDB set-aside
HBCU or Minority Inst. set-aside
Ethnic group
Women-owned business
SB innovative research program
Subcontracting plan

Field Entry
Dairy Foods and Eggs
B2
SUBSISTENCE
4000
N/A OR CLASSIFIED
5149
5
B
S
B
A
A
N
J
2
3
B
A
N
Z
Y
C
D
D
A
A
A
N
A
B
N

table omits thirteen variables whose values are missing in this observation. Entry values map to form DD 350 values, displayed in
figure 1.1. SB and SDB refer to small business and small disadvantaged business, respectively. HBCU refers to Historically Black
College/University

Table 1.1: The above table provides a sample observation from the fiscal year file of 1998, and is for illustrative purposes. This

Field Name
Fiscal reporting period ’yyyymm’
Reporting Component FIPS95
Report number
Contracting office code
Contracting office name
Contract number
Origin of contract
Modification/order number
Action date ’yyyymmdd’
Completion date ’yyyymmdd’
Contractor identification code
Headquarters code
Ultimate parent code
Government agency
CAGE
Contractor name
street address
city
state/country
ZIP code
City or place code
County code
State/Country code
City or place name
County name
State/Country name
Number of actions
Dollars
Foreign Military Sale
Multiyear contract
Multiyear contract cost
Product/Service Code

Sample of Typical Observation
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311,415
437,039
297,682

Mean
392,654
617,978
298,633
380,081

Mean
169,272
400,752
251,145
300,045

1,979,340
4,199,399
22,667,546

observations
159,639
1,920,908
5,635,280
7,715,827

observations
793,221
6,116,750
10,475,923
17,385,894

N/A
One Source
More Than One Source
Total

N/A
One offer
More than One Offer
Total

Kurtosis
395,903
32,940
2,332,928
7,348,699

Offers Received
Median Skewness
25,616
0.00
18,090
144.07
17,789
9.07
18,253
0.79

12,750
26,748
9,454,244

Kurtosis
55,298
23,600
45,935
46,797

80.66
130.21
0.96

Kurtosis
17,278
5,602,681
91,435

Offers Solicited
Median Skewness
65,274
147.52
49,311
119.17
40,000
162.99
42,370
159.05

11,385
22,444
24,000

Extent Competed
Median Skewness
35,000
79.60
22,482
0.14
37,000
210.70

sd
184,400,000
9,390,667
13,210,899
41,084,720

sd
11,864,970
11,389,790
5,428,826
7,533,469

7,293,606
10,490,711
36,101,429

sd
6,241,358
47,489,032
7,537,195

mean across units suggests that increasing competition is associated with reduced average costs, perhaps presents reason to include
competition extents in estimation strategies.

Table 1.2: This table displays the extent of dollar obligations across various competitive factors for contracts. Noticing that the

Mean
311,453
242,156
351,159

observations
2,560,498
12,774,901
1,153,408

Types
N/A
Full and Open
Not
Available
for
Comp.
Follow On Competition
Non-Competed
Total

Contract Distribution Accross Competition Factors
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419,536
56,123
196,808
721,439
2,660,617
1,415,411
1,488,481
525,944
417,241
496,032
2,537,448
312,283
132,469
13
698,747
71,844
300369.95

9,440
4,856
17,327,483
640,449
111,221
165,050
346,798
237,474
14,682
1,505,381
126,657
542,009
186,232
58,325
177,787
139
21,523,273

47,000
90,000
50,000
87,000
86,794
107,795
55,576
14,142
0
6,598
0
23,684

39,940

21,000
19,139
20,133

25,000

47.90
42.92
73.49
94.60
223.86
41.51
32.96
52.47
234.34
-0.0004
4.26
0.90

36.27

6.82
17.16
63.77

45.95

Contract Type
Median Skewness
35,000
39.59

4,999.97
3,238.11
8,431.14
10,422.98
109,456.18
3,579.36
4,106.75
4,915.28
55,899.72
88,615.35
23.74
9,010,090.50

1,796.70

283.92
3,507,357.20
6,340.28

3,515.05

Kurtosis
2,300.26

20,010,449
14,927,947
7,403,887
3,632,647
6,243,649
25,965,639
1,926,853
980,969
2,791
389,700,000
218,480
37,014,578

37,995,222

329,619
10,521,439
12,883,298

5,319,789

sd
4,071,873

†- These categories are only present in the files from 2007 and later.

Table 1.3: This table contains the distributional descriptions on the type of contract signed, for available observations.

Fixed Price, Redetermination
A
Fixed Price, Redetermination
B
Fixed Price, Other Redeterm.
Firm Fixed Price
Fixed Price Economic Price
Adj.
Fixed Price Perform. Incentive
Fixed Price Award Fee
Cost Plus Award Fee
Cost Contract
Cost Sharing
Cost Plus Fixed Fee
Cost Plus Incentive Fee
Time and Material
Labor Hour
Order depended†
Combination†
other†
Total

Mean
367,378

Obs.
69,290

Contract Distribution by Contract Pricing Structure
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Mean
1,276,010
2,539,756
402,188
1,206,396
167,089
2,290,077
249,744
303,242

Contract Financing
Median Skewness
Kurtosis
60,480
84.04
10,491.18
131,000
32.55
1,604.18
49,065
0.37
241,584.80
31,464.50
81.81
10,560.92
7,008
97.77
13,239.23
9,600
38.68
1,851.16
16,797
0.30
6,466,192.90
18,108
0.65
6,410,965.30

sd
18,814,755
26,402,434
48,365,755
20,055,892
3,609,785
35,315,518
44,996,417
44,062,023

observations.

Table 1.4: This table contains the distributional descriptions on the type of contract signed and contract financing, for available

Progress Payment
DFARS 252.232-7004
Percentage of Completion
Unusual PP or AP
Commercial Financing
Performance Based Financing
Not Available for Financing
Total

Obs.
475,115
19,599
506,297
47,318
225,004
83,113
13,707,796
15,064,242

Contract Distribution by Contract Payment Structure

U.S. Federal Contracting

1982
1983
1984
1985
1986

All Contracts
Dollars
% of Tot.
(000s)
Federal Dollars
125,082,843
78.69
135,462,268
80.54
145,673,741
79.65
163,644,190
81.92
158,983,888
79.51

1987
1988
1989
1990
1991

155,384,596
149,227,088
137,039,220
142,210,430
149,016,250

78.77
76.58
74.41
74.38
70.73

1.66
1.63
2.28
1.84
2.18

90.97
90.41
92.42
90.22
90.49

71.66
69.24
68.77
67.10
64.00

1992
1993
1994
1995
1996

135,236,112
136,022,346
131,907,204
132,349,622
135,303,363

67.71
67.75
67.16
65.42
68.48

2.19
1.92
2.00
2.17
2.93

89.02
89.27
89.31
89.48
90.67

60.27
60.48
59.98
58.54
62.09

1997
1998
1999
2000
2001

126,802,192
126,953,050
133,315,113
142,047,609
156,456,002

66.76
64.35
67.08
64.91
66.61

3.57
4.02
4.64
5.61
4.32

91.03
91.67
92.40
93.00
91.01

60.77
58.99
61.98
60.36
60.62

2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007

164,688,843
208,658,211
238,126,937
268,425,648
295,624,557
330,757,977

65.83
68.30
69.74
70.94
71.23
71.90

7.10
9.73
10.96
100.00
100.00
0.00

93.73
94.97
96.14
100.00
100.00

61.70
64.87
67.05
70.94
71.23

Fiscal Year

Contracts Above Individual Summary Threshold†
% of DoD
% of DoD
% of Tot.
Actions
Dollars
Federal Dollars
3.15
93.55
73.61
1.61
90.96
73.26
1.58
91.45
72.83
1.69
92.02
75.38
1.77
91.77
72.96

Table 1.5: This table illustrates the size of defense contract spending versus total federal
contract-procurement spending, coming from the Federal Procurement Data System annual
reports, at https://www.fpds.gov/fpdsng_cms/index.php/reports.
†-The summary threshold is the dollar amount above which individual contracting actions
must be reported, and below which all contract actions are collectively summarized. For FY
1982 and FY 1983, this threshold was 10,000 dollars. For FY 1984 - FY 2004 this threshold
was 25,000, with the threshold elimination in FY 2004- FY 2007.
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Figure 1.2: This figure captures the relative size of defense procurements for contracts
above the summarized reporting threshold for fiscal years 1982 through 2004, compared
against all federal contracts. The summarized reporting threshold prior to FY 1984 is for
contracts above 10,000 dollars and FY 1984 and later above 25,000 dollars. It illustrates
the relatively small number of contract actions contrasted against the fact that these few
contracts account for a large majority of all federal procurement.
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59

22,667,546
12,473,872
10,193,674
5,636,380
4,557,294

All Fys
2004 -2012
pre 2004
- 1984-2003
-1966-1983

297,682
240,775
367,319
483,246
223,942

Mean
24,000
7,807
46,000
64,403
28,000

Median
0.96
0.40
131.03
134.71
45.19

Skew
9,454,243
5,388,040
40,827
36,087
13,460

Kurtosis
36,101,429
48,241,843
7,091,874
8,402,191
5,014,798

SD
0
0
11,000
9,515
11,000

10

4,837.84
1,745
22,000
33,752
15,000

75,000
36,000
117,000
172,000
70,000

Percentiles
25
75

277,000
171,229
390,000
519,000
213,000

90

of the data, in order to better illustrate the distributional aspects of contract dollar amount. These subsets correspond to a few
changes in administrative record keeping, in FY 1984 and again over the years FY 2004 - FY 2006

Table 1.6: Presented above are a few descriptive statistics pertaining to Dollar Obligations for contract spending over various subsets

obs

FY sets

Distributional Statistics Across Administrative Changes

Dollar Density Estimates
Inner 80th
4e-05
3e-05
2e-05
1e-05
0e+00
0

50000

100000

150000

200000

250000

Inner Quartile
4e-05
3e-05
2e-05
1e-05
0e+00
0

20000

40000

60000

Contract Dollar Amount

Figure 1.3: The above two charts display two kernel density estimates of individual contract
dollars, with outer tails stripped to better visualize the data. The Top graph displays
observations of the 10th up to and including the 90th percentile and is estimate using a
bandwidth of 1141 and a total of 18,976,286 observations. The lower graph displays the
inner quartile of spending observations, estimated with a bandwidth of 654.5 and 11,345,720
observations.
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61
-383,986
-445
-482,576
-23,050
-2,296,321

Mean

2,865,019
418,647
5,314,940
896,468
20,712,460

Mean

-17,623
-308
-30,351
-11,000
-312,367

Median

650,000
400,000
1,494,000
578,800
7,987,992

Median

-1,103.75
-0.79
-984.46
-1.50
-439.81

1,268,148
2.44
1,008,831
4.55
201,344

Kurtosis

Left Tail Statistics
SD
Skew
100,184,213
413
112,324,713
28,414
251,429,648

1,779,215
2.16
890,360
6.14
178,249

1,267.78
0.50
897.21
1.88
402.26

81,962,518
102,224
115,910,345
768,772
259,558,583

Right Tail Statistics
SD
Skew
Kurtosis

-1.1609E+11
-1.4570E+03
-1.1609E+11
-1.2300E+05
-1.1609E+11

Min

277,002
277,002
650,001
277,002
4,000,014

Min

0
0
-1,457
0
-123,003

Max

1.1609E+11
6.5000E+05
1.1609E+11
4.0000E+06
1.1609E+11

Max

distribution of obligated contract dollars. There appears to be relative symmetry between the left and right tails, typically associated
with obligated and subsequently deobligated contracts. The main point of this table is to show how the characteristics of the
distribution are by and large the result of the most extreme observations.

Table 1.7: The above table is included to better describe the nature of outlier observations in the left and right tails of the

1,424,710
291,302
1,133,373
1,198,031
226,185

< 10
<10 to 5
<5
< 10 to 1
<1

2,266,556
1,131,128
1,132,309
2,039,502
224,812

obs

90
90 to 95
95
90 to 99
99

obs

percentile

>
>
>
>
>

percentile

Distribution Tail Descriptive Statistics
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Mean
198,522
151,018
256,717
326,408
170,616

Mean
257,661
199,381
328,985
420,898
215,312

obs
22,622,210
12,455,222
10,166,988
5,618,926
4,548,062

obs
22,663,016
12,472,017
10,190,999
5,634,844
4,556,155

All Fys
2004 -2012
pre 2004
- 1984-2003
-1966-1983

All Fys
2004 -2012
pre 2004
- 1984-2003
-1966-1983

Skew
6.11
7.03
5.39
4.71
6.86

Kurtosis
48.37
62.72
38.35
29.78
60.73

SD
346,357
309,967
382,819
429,019
309,759

10
0
0
11,000
17,903
11,000

Percentiles
25
75
5,000
73,162
1,973
34,906
23,000 113,000
34,291 164,533
15,000 68,000

Kurtosis
290.20
359.16
235.90
185.53
358.81

SD
1,143,528
1,028,632
1,267,773
1,427,880
1,029,866

10
0
0
11,000
10,000
11,000

90
277,000
171,000
389,676
518,000
213,000

Skew
14.88
16.58
13.39
11.86
16.57

Outliers Dropped: Below .01 and Above 99.99 Percent
Percentiles
Median Skew Kurtosis
SD
10
25
75
24,000 38.08 2,010.87 2,720,678
0
4,840
7,500
7,806
42.72 2,530.65 2,446,564
0
1,746
35,998
46,000 34.06 1,608.40 3,020,975 11,000 22,000 117,000
64,400 30.31 1,265.62 3,435,524 9,563 33,760 172,000
28,000 41.48 2,422.61 2,406,803 11,000 15,000 70,000

Median
24,000
7,804
46,000
64,399
28,000

90
274,263
169,346
385,000
510,000
211,000

90
250,000
152,470
349,784
462,074
200,000

Percentiles
25
75
4,857
75,000
1,762
35,881
22,000 116,774
33,859 171,000
15,000 70,000

Outliers Dropped: Below .1 and Above 99.9 Percent

Median
24,000
7,793
46,092
64,529
28,000

observations dropped, starting at the outer 1 percentiles and moving to the outer .1 and .01 percentiles. The 1 to 99 percentile
group cuts a total of 450,997 observations, 226,185 from the left tail and 224812 from the right. The .1 to 99.9 group cuts a total
of 45,336 observations, 22,668 from the left and right. The .01 to 99.99 group cuts only 4,530 observations, 2,267 from the left and
2,263 from the right tail. The purpose is to compare how even with the most parsimonious cut of data, the statistics exhibit much
more consistency across time periods than they do in 1.6.

Table 1.8: This table replicates the statistics in 1.6, after outliers in both tails are dropped. Each group accounts for fewer

Mean
117,512
84,793
157,995
200,523
106,165

obs
22,216,549
12,286,401
9,930,148
5,454,510
4,475,638

FY sets
All Fys
2004 -2012
pre 2004
- 1984-2003
-1966-1983

Outliers Dropped: Below 1 and Above 99 Percent

Distributional Statistics: Outlier Exclusions
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of the data, while the two plots on the right only contain data above the individual reporting threshold, as described in footnote 16.
The top two plots contain current value data, and the bottom two plots are inflation adjusted using the annual CPI measure from
the BLS, with a base year of 1983-1984. Also please note that the origin of each graph does not necessarily correspond to zero, with
the tick marks drawn to scale.

Figure 1.4: These are annual plots that chart the total spending in that calendar year. The two left plots contain all observations
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Annual Spending Statistics:
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Figure 1.5: The above charts are made using the the contract data from 1966 to 2012
calendar years, with contract dollars deflated using the annual CPI from the BLS, vertical
scales are in thousands. Charts on the left contain all data observations, charts on the right
are made with observations above the the individual reporting threshold, as described in
footnote 16. Also please note that the origin of each graph does not correspond to zero,
and tick marks are drawn to scale.
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0.01 percentiles, across calendar years. Each contract is deflated with the annual CPI measure from the BLS, with a base year of
1983-1984. Then the contracts are ordered and the cutoff value for each percentile is calculated. For the upper tail, these values are
3024608, 26850466, and 165698208, respectively. For the lower tail, these values are -99486, -1597531, and -18077554, respectively.

Figure 1.6: The above graphs chart the impact of the outlier exclusions of observations outside the upper and lower 1.0, 0.1 and

Spending (in billions)
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stated in table 1.8 is amounts to 4,530 individual observations. Further each contract observation was deflated with the corresponding
annual CPI figure from the BLS, with a base year of 1983-1984.

Figure 1.7: The above data to form these figures has been purged of the outer 0.01 percent of contracts by dollar amount, which as
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Figure 1.8: This chart displays the seasonal frequency of individual contracts, in months
and weeks. The end of the federal fiscal year is September 30, which is reflected in the
above graphs with a year-end rush to sign contracts.
†Denotes Weekly observations are only available from FY 1984 and on, as the observations
prior to this point only contain information at the monthly frequency.
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from the BLS. The data in a weekly frequency is taken from observations starting in FY 1984 and on, as observations prior to this
period are only recorded in monthly frequency. Utilizing monthly frequency data to include all observations however, reflects a similar
pattern shown above.

Figure 1.9: The above charts have been generated using contract obligated dollar amount data, deflated using the monthly CPI
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observations
1,394,819
4,374,375
12,729,142
1,274,016
317,429
130,675
121,756
187,893
20,530,105

Mean
94,713
77,627
199,875
878,640
2,040,592
2,562,270
1,743,967
2,166,828
279,460

Median
1,672
10,237
25,055
66,141
100,000
94,791
36,973
38,000
20,100

Skewness
78.03
318.67
6.12
0.00
52.47
36.28
60.11
44.68
0.83

Kurtosis
37,814
209,331
4,905,994
613,816
5,119
2,159
6,183
2,903
8,647,458

sd
3,650,062
2,692,528
10,175,051
146,817,802
22,466,953
27,259,688
23,547,033
35,702,964
37,840,970

Percentiles
10
90
-25,000 108,268
0
84,000
4
250,321
0
1,195,000
0
2,403,100
0
2,563,000
0
1,200,000
-5,291
884,824
0
255,548

few contracts have long expected terminal dates to support long term supply of goods or services. The above pool of observations
were cut at the terminal date of December 25, 2060, with larger dates removed as a precaution against measurement error, totaling
3092 observations, as well as dates before January 1, 1960 totaling 270 observations. The table collectively summarizes contracts
who’s length exceeds five years in following with the FAR, which states that multi-year or option contracts may only exceed a five
years under special circumstances, based on individual approval.

Table 1.9: The above table displays summary statistics of obligated contract dollar amounts across levels of contract duration. A

Months
<0
0-1
1 - 12
13 - 24
25 - 36
37 - 48
49 - 60
> 60
Total

Obligated Contract Dollars by Monthly Duration
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the summation of contract spending in each calendar year within a given state, deflated with the respective annual level CPI, then
averaged across each respective decade . This graphic does not include data from contracts prior to 1970 and after 2010, and is used
to note the shift in State aggregate spending over broad periods of time.

Figure 1.10: The above figure displays a map of the contract spending totals in the contiguous United States. This data represents
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Figure 1.11: This figure displays time series plots for the annual summed spending for all
50 United States. The data reflected here is deflated with the annual, national CPI
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1.7321
1.5852

1.8161
1.7325

1.4491
1.4494

1.6718
1.3814

13,542,517
13,517,664

5,420,679
5,409,304

8,121,837
8,108,360

10,709,068
10,709,068

9.534E+04

7.781E+04

7.141E+04

2378
2378

684
684

Services Only
0.213
4.848E+06
0.2841 3.424E+06
Goods Only
0.1975 5.602E+06
0.3985 2.357E+06
Goods Only: 1966 - 2012
0.2283 8.858E+06 736
0.4731 2.691E+06 736

3.879E+07
3.879E+07

2.835E+07
2.835E+07

2.272E+07
2.272E+07

50

50

50

50

1.319E+05

Pooled Goods/Services
0.2725 1.522E+07 3064
0.3906 7.674E+06 3064

5.585E+07
5.585E+07

df

9.119E+06

5.465E+06

1.489E+06

6.344E+06

Time
Partial SS

47

29

30

30

df

The first three groupings contain the same truncated time span of contracts after the revisions of the 1984 CICA act. Contract
dollars are deflated with annual, national CPI with a base year of 1983-1984. Time effects are for annual calendar year, and State
effects include the 50 U.S. states plus the District of Columbia. Asterisks denote significance in conventional ways. Each grouped
row signifies different subsets of the data, with the first two including all observations, then only service contracts, and finally only
goods. Estimated within each subset is once with only the FSC factor variable, then again with FSC, state, and year factor variables.

Table 1.10: The above table presents the results from 8 separate ANOVA estimations, with each row representing a new estimate.

Root MSE

Obs

ANOVA Estimations: Subsets Across FSC Groups
FSC ids
State
Total SS
Adj. R2 Partial SS
df
Partial SS

73
9.058E+06

9.990E+06

1.021E+07

1.136E+07

Mean
1.294E+07

RDTE/AircraftDemo/Valid
Other ADP & Telecommunication Services
Systems
Engineering
Services

4.042E+10

4.442E+10

4.559E+10

Other Professional Services
Maint/Other Miscellaneous Buildings
Architect-Engineering
Services

Most Frequent
Engineering Technical
Services
Other ADP & Telecommunication Services

Service Categories
Dollar Total
Sum
Engineering Technical 6.778E+10
Services
General Health Care 5.388E+10
Services

262,563

Meat, Poultry, and Fish

6.533E+10

4.415E+06

Guided Missiles

309,301

137,707

165,040

176,639

273,690

Count
314,940

366,399

Count
976,129
385,325

international contracts. Data is deflated using annual frequency, national CPI figures, with a base year of 1983-1984. RDTE stands
for research, development, test and evaluation.

Table 1.11: The above statistics are calculated on contracts from the post CICA 1984 data panel, from 1984-2012, and include

Contract Cost
RDTE/Health Services Management Support
RDTE/SpaceScience
ApplicationsEng/Manuf Devel
Purchase/ Ammunition
Facilities
RDTE/Energy - Nuclear
- Adv Tech Dev
RDTE/Sp & Terrestrial
Application-Eng/Manuf
Devel

Guided Missile Systems,
Complete
Depth Charge Inert
Components
Aircraft Fixed Wing

Contract Cost
Nuclear Components
Nuclear Reactors

FSC Summary Statistics: Goods Versus Services
Goods Categories
Mean
Dollar Total
Sum
Most Frequent
8.159E+06 Aircraft Fixed Wing
3.764E+11 Drugs & Biologicals
6.215E+06 Gas Turbines and Jet 1.349E+11 Medical & Surgical
Engines, Acft & Comps
Instruments, Equip &
Supplies
5.568E+06 Liquid Propellants & 1.148E+11 Airframe
Structural
Fuel, Petroleum Base
Components
4.605E+06 Aircraft Rotary Wing
6.685E+10 Dairy Foods and Eggs

Model

R̄2

(1)

0.5058

(1-2)

0.4833

(2)

0.409

(2-1)

0.4868

(3)

0.4948

(4)

0.5031

Decomposition of Regression Variance
Covariance with Spending
Product
State
Year
Interaction
Total
Effects
Effects
Effects
Effects
Variance
3.4165
100
3.4165
100
3.4165
100
3.4165
100
3.4165
100
3.4165
100

0.2863
8.3804
0.1645
4.8139
0.2846
8.3309
0.1642
4.8047
0.1626
4.7588
0.2374
6.9494

0.0094
0.2743
0.0080
0.2342
0.0187
0.5477
0.0190
0.5573
0.0146
0.4287
0.0079
0.2312

0.8384
24.5386
0.8667
25.3690
0.8000
23.4146
0.8035
23.5173
0.8371
24.5012
0.8705
25.4806

0.0400
1.1706
0.0628
1.8387
0.0834
2.4408
0.0153
0.4470

Covariate
Effects
0.5051
14.7830
0.5130
15.0162
0.5047
14.7726
0.5130
15.0147
0.5180
15.1608
0.5156
15.0910

Table 1.12: This table lists the computed decomposition of variance for model 1.1 through
model 1.4 with model (1-2) and (2-2) indicating that an aggregated 2 digit product id
variable was used instead of the 4 digit variable, using log measured, CPI deflated spending.
The listed percentages denote the proportion of variance captured by the various groups of
regressors. Note that the variances/covariances are calculated on the estimation sample for
that particular regression, and each regression consists of 2,022,483 obser.
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r
1.1115
(.0225)***
1.2594
(.0221)***
1.1293
(.0225)***
1.2683
(.0223)***
1.2334
(.0220)***
1.3306
(.0224)***

s
1.0847
(.0491)***
1.2301
(.0519)***
1.0954
(.0492)***
1.2418
(.0519)***
1.2608
(.0514)***
1.1895
(.0519)***

a
0.0494
(.0236)**
0.0186
(.0241)*
0.0348
(.0237)
0.0024
(.0242)
(0.0136)
(.0241)
0.0133
(.0243)
Cost
t
0.0826
(.1722)
0.1591
(.1822)
0.0871
(.1716)
0.1715
(.1821)
0.1483
(.1779)
0.0790
(.1748)

Type Contracts
u
v
0.7892
1.5702
(.0131)*** (.0328)***
0.9053
1.7533
(.0133)*** (.0340)***
0.7839
1.5663
(.0131)*** (.0328)***
0.9002
1.7502
(.0133)*** (.0339)***
0.9058
1.7500
(.0132)*** (.0334)***
0.8818
1.6377
(.0132)*** (.0349)***

Fixed Price Contracts
k
l
m
0.1538
0.4401
0.7535
(.0046)*** (.0250)*** (.0815)***
0.1880
0.4360
0.8985
(.0047)*** (.0224)*** (.0866)***
0.1571
0.4295
0.7359
(.0047)*** (.0249)*** (.0816)***
0.1914
0.4381
0.8762
(.0047)*** (.0224)*** (.0867)***
0.1941
0.4804
0.8431
(.0047)*** (.0228)*** (.0852)***
0.1873
0.5446
0.8837
(.0049)*** (.0245)*** (.0867)***

y
0.2615
(.0163)***
0.5439
(.0161)***
0.2653
(.0163)***
0.4545
(.0161)***
0.4701
(.0161)***
0.3981
(.0162)***

z
0.3144
(.0305)***
0.3991
(.0283)***
0.3326
(.0304)***
0.4259
(.0284)***
0.3999
(.0313)***
0.4058
(.0331)***

of the effects of each level of contract types. The base level is firm, fixed price contracts and effects listed above can be compared
against these contracts. The contract types listed above are as follows: A - fixed price, redetermination; K - fixed price, escalation; L
- fixed price, incentive; M - fixed price, award fee; R - cost, award fee; S - cost; T - cost sharing; U - cost, fixed fee; V - cost, incentive
fee; Y - time and materials; Z - labor hours.

Table 1.13: The figures above are produced from the same estimations listed in table 1.12, but with a more detailed break down

(4)

(3)

(2 - 2)

(2)

(1 - 2)

(1)

(4)

(3)

(2 - 2)

(2)

(1 - 2)

Model
(1)

Coefficient Estimates for Contract Types

Model
(1)
(1 - 2)
(2)
(2 - 2)
(3)
(4)

Coefficient Estimates for Finance Types
Financing Options
A
C
D
E
0.6974
0.6413
0.4854
0.1123
(.0050)*** (.0273)*** (.0383)*** (.0098)***
0.7429
0.5584
0.7400
0.1470
(.0050)*** (.0238)*** (.0394)*** (.0100)***
0.7001
0.6564
0.4860
0.1045
(.0050)*** (.0274)*** (.0385)*** (.0098)***
0.7450
0.5789
0.7342
0.1376
(.0050)*** (.0243)*** (.0396)*** (.0101)***
0.7619
0.5686
0.7484
0.1780
(.0050)*** (.0240)*** (.0390)*** (.0101)***
0.7435
0.6730
0.6913
0.1049
(.0051)*** (.0247)*** (.0395)*** (.0100)***

Table 1.14:

F
1.3396
(.0311)***
1.5924
(.0314)***
1.3415
(.0311)***
1.5921
(.0314)***
1.5491
(.0309)***
1.5092
(.0314)***

The figures above are produced from the same estimations listed in table
1.12. These coefficients represent the effects of various financing options for individual contracts, with no financing as the base level to compare with. Standard errors are displayed
in parenthesis below each point estimate with asterisks indicating significance in the standard fashion. The financing options listed above correspond to the following options: A Progress Payments, C - Percentage of Completion, D - Unusual Progress Payment or Advanced Payment, E - Commercial Financing, and F - Performance Based Financing. Models
correspond to equations 1.1 - 1.4, with model (1-2) and (2-2) indicating that an aggregated
2 digit product id variable was used instead of the 4 digit variable.
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Coefficient Estimates for Extent of Competition

Model
(1)
(1 - 2)
(2)
(2 - 2)
(3)
(4)

Not Available for
-0.0144
(.0055)***
0.1454
(.0056)***
-0.0106
(.0055)**
0.1509
(.0056)***
0.0968
(.0056)***
0.1252
(.0057)***

Levels of Competition
Comp Follow On Competition
-0.0742
(.0101)***
0.0190
(.0103)*
-0.0896
(.0102)***
0.0002
(.0104)***
0.0191
(.0103)*
0.0264
(.0107)**

Table 1.15:

Not Competed
0.0326
(.0026)***
0.0412
(.0026)***
0.0346
(.0026)***
0.0447
(.0026)***
0.0382
(.0026)***
0.0567
(.0026)***

The figures above are produced from the same estimations listed in table
1.12. These coefficients represent the effects of various restraints on competition, where the
base level is full and open competition. Standard errors are displayed in parenthesis below
each point estimate with asterisks indicating significance in the standard fashion. Models
correspond to equations 1.1 - 1.4, with model (1-2) and (2-2) indicating that an aggregated
2 digit product id variable was used instead of the 4 digit variable.
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Coefficient Estimates for Time Dimension Covariates
Model multi-year-contract last month log(duration)
(1)
-0.1167
0.1119
0.4310
(.0334)***
(.0027)***
(.0014)***
0.3102
0.1126
0.4341
(1 - 2)
(.0260)***
(.0028)***
(.0013)***
(2)
-0.1162
0.1127
0.4306
(.0337)***
(.0027)***
(.0014)***
(2 - 2)
0.3075
0.1135
0.4340
(.0261)
(.0028)***
(.0014)***
(3)
0.3595
0.1156
0.4360
(.0270)***
(.0027)***
(.0014)***
(4)
0.3744
0.1100
0.4328
(.0272)***
(.0027)***
(.0014)***

Table 1.16: The figures above are produced from the same estimations listed in table 1.12.
These coefficients represent the effects of various measures of individual contract length
and timing. multi-year-contract indicates whether the original signed contract was for more
than a one year term, last month indicates whether the contract was signed in September,
and log(duration) is a natural log transformed measure of the months from the sign date
to the end of a contract. Standard errors are displayed in parenthesis below each point
estimate with asterisks indicating significance in the standard fashion. Models correspond
to equations 1.1 - 1.4, with model (1-2) and (2-2) indicating that an aggregated 2 digit
product id variable was used instead of the 4 digit variable.
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CHAPTER 2
ESTIMATING A STATE FISCAL MULTIPLIER

2.1

Introduction

Views on the role of government spending have long been split across political and
ideological lines. These divisions are perhaps no more obvious than in the current
political climate, with partisanship predominantly focused on the government’s fiscal
responsibility. This study will attempt describe of effectiveness of fiscal policy by
estimating a fiscal multiplier across States. Using a panel study natural experiment
framework, I will deploy defense contracting data to isolate the short-run, immediate
effects of an increase in federal spending on state output.
Arguments about fiscal multipliers are typically centered around whether they are
larger or smaller than unity. The fiscal policy multiplier measures the rate at which
government spending boosts output, and if it is greater than one there is significant
justification for it’s use to correct economic woes. If the true multiplier is lower than
one however, this justification quickly dries up and then the arguments for stimulus
are much more difficult to defend.
Perhaps the gulf between these opposing ideologies could be bridged if there was
more consensus on estimates of a multiplier. Predictions about aggregate economic
indicators are typically linked to the underlying theoretical framework being used.
The typical neoclassical framework has suggested multipliers from as low as 0.02 as
in ? to slightly over unity (?). These models emphasize a perfectly competitive
market structure with flexible prices (?), where fiscal shocks correspond to a positive
movement in output and labor supply and a decrease in consumption, depending on
the the financing of the spending (?) . The most typical criticisms of this class of
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models is the failure to reconcile predictions with stylized facts about the movements
of aggregate consumption, wages and productivity (?).
New Keynesian models can generate higher fiscal multipliers, such as 1.6 estimated
by ? and 1.7 estimated by ?. Where these models typically rely on various market
imperfections and price rigidities in their specification1 .
Likewise there is a dearth of consensus in the empirical multiplier estimates. A
great deal of research is conducted through SVAR analysis, where the timing of
government spending is typically assumed to precede other macroeconomic variables
as in ?, ?, ?, and ?, which justify their estimates in a theoretical new Keynesian,
sticky price framework. The timing of spending shocks is of serious concern with these
models however, as estimates distinguishing between anticipated and unanticipated
spending shocks can yield effects of opposite sign (?).
Alternatively, estimation utilizing the narrative approach first illustrated by ?
attempts to address the issue of timing by isolating the news of a military spending
shock. The narrative approach method uses the dates of news reports about military
buildups in conjunction with military spending data to isolate the exogenous effects
of government spending, and typically produces estimates of multipliers consistent
with neoclassical models, as in ?, ? and ?. While exogeneity of military spending
is the typical assumption in the literature2 , military expenditure decisions are highly
political and as such have the potential to be economically driven. ? highlights the
use of military spending as an instrument of fiscal policy. While some may say this
1?

note that their estimates are made with a slight reversion of assumptions from
forward looking (?) to rule-of-thumb consumers, among other special features made in
their analysis
2 Not

only is it assumed, it is the main justification for using military spending data in
these estimates, see ?
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is a cynical view of U.S. foreign policy, turning a blind eye on these issues could
seriously bias any resulting estimates.
The present analysis attempts to address this possibility of endogeneity by taking
advantage of the natural experiment environment afforded by the United States. This
analysis looks at military contract spending at the State level, and its effects on GSP
and employment. The methods in the current chapter is perhaps most similar to ?,
who utilize State level military contract data to construct an instrument and estimate
spending effects through 2SLS estimation. Their main identification assumption is
that the federal government does not embark on aggregate level military buildups on
the basis of the economic conditions of any one individual State. The variance among
interstate economic idiosyncrasies is used to estimate an “open economy relative
multiplier” of 1.5.
The following analysis will utilize a continuous difference-in-differences (henceforth
DD) estimation across States, as the method of guarding against endogeneity bias.
Difference-in-differences estimation techniques utilize a treatment and control framework to take advantage of “natural experiment” scenarios across various groups. The
primary assumption for DD estimation is that the groups are similar enough that, in
the counter-factual state without “treatment,” the average difference between groups
would be unchanged. Typical DD experiments use a binary treatment effect, however the experiment in the current study will utilize defense contract spending as a
continuous treatment variable. The strategy deployed here will produce a short-run,
continuous measure of the effect of spending on GSP, or a State level fiscal multiplier.
Combined with standard fixed effects estimators, the differences in agglomeration of
defense contracting across States provides enough variation to produce multiplier estimates in the range common to the literature, while State characteristics are similar
enough to provide a check against endogeneity bias described above.
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Although DD estimation has been widely used in microeconometric analysis (specifically labor economics and wage studies) it has received little implementation in
macroeconomic study. ? use DD analysis to study the effects of trade openness on
economic growth at an international scale. ? also use DD to study the link between
improved nutrition and the rapid urbanization experienced between the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries. Care must be taken to ensure a well designed DD macroeconomic experiment (?). If an exogenous shock is isolated, resulting analyses can
yield relatively insightful findings, which are not as vulnerable to endogeneity bias.
As ? point out, two important advantages result from analysis at the State level.
First, using a panel of State level data implies that monetary policy is constant
across groups, through constant nominal interest and exchange rates. Holding these
aggregate effects constant eliminates any estimation errors possible in macro studies,
which arise when one does not control for reactionary monetary policy as a result
of spending shocks enacted through congress. The current experiment puts primary
focus on the defense spending shock that occurs in 1982 as will be outlined in the
following sections. Considering the severe monetary policy shocks introduced by
Volcker during this time, an experiment of this nature is particularly useful.
Second, the treatment is directly financed through federal taxation and borrowing
which is also constant across regions. Therefore, relative changes in procurement
spending across groups does not translate to relative changes in federal taxes across
those groups. By fixing the effects of monetary and fiscal policy, we can get a more
direct picture of the effects on output.
To preview these results, our short-run, DD analysis produces a State-level relative
fiscal multiplier of 1.19, with alternate regression specifications yielding multipliers in
the range of 1.17 - 1.21. This multiplier is in the lower range of many New Keynesian
models but higher than the typical neoclassical models would suggest.
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The rest of the chapter will proceed as follows. Section two will describe the
sources and transformations of the data used in this analysis. Section three will
briefly describe the aggregate and State level trends in military procurement spending. Section four will outline the experimental design, where the construction of the
regressions will be described, as well as selection and justification of the timing and
also discussion of the results. Section five concludes.

2.2

Data Sources

The data employed in the analysis is compiled from a variety of sources, including
the Bureau of Economic Analysis, the Bureau of Labor Statistics, the United States
Census Bureau and the Department of Defense. The data gathered from the department of defense form DD 350 as described in the first chapter is the foundation of
this study. These figures are aggregated to the total dollar value for each State, for
each calender year.
The GSP data are gathered from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. Unfortunately,
real GSP is only published back to 1987. However, using the same method employed
by the BEA, real GSP is reconstructed back to 1977 using the State quantity index and
nominal GSP series, both publicly available from the BEA. Because of the reporting
structure of the BEA, all real figures are presented in 1997 dollars.
Historical data on State level prices is also difficult to come by, where the BLS
only publishes CPI data at national and regional level3 . To control for prices I use
the constructed real GSP series to create a GSP deflator. Use of this deflator allows
the analysis of real changes as a result of government spending changes. As with the
3 These

regions are also somewhat broad; Northeast, Midwest, South and West. One
can easily imagine large variation of prices within these regions, say between Montana and
California, both in the Western region.
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real GSP series, the deflator is also presented in 1997 dollars4 . We use this deflator
to adjust for military spending prices.
State level population data are derived from the U.S. Census. Since the census
is conducted once every decade, the inter-survey years are population interpolations
generated by the Census Bureau. We utilize this series to control for population flows
between States and potential effects this may have on the estimations, by transforming
the aggregate level data to per-capita terms. Employment data are compiled from the
Bureau of Labor Statistics. Each State series is collected from the total count of nonfarm State employees, annually from 1965 through 2010. Unfortunately total hours
or average weekly hours worked at the State level are only available from 2007 and on,
so the count of actual employment must be used. Data on State level consumption
are not readily available, and therefore out of the scope of this analysis.

2.3

Trends in Military Procurement: 1977-2006

United States military excursions since 1977 have palled in comparison to those of
previous decades. The largest two buildups within the boundaries of the panel both
began with the Carter-Regan buildup and with the events of September 11, 2001
as described in great detail in ? and ?. These episodes of high spending are much
smaller than those seen during of course World War II, but also the Korean War, and
even the Vietnam War (??). The DD estimation requires that the shock be carefully
selected to be able to be able to capture its effects. Therefore the work of ? and ?
will be expanded upon in this section to better justify the focus this study places on
these time periods.
4 The

BEA changed its reporting regime from the SIC to the NAICS, where both series
present data in 1997. While the BEA warns against appending the two datasets outright,
the deflator was separately constructed and properly transformed, then joined smoothly
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To provide some visual context with figure 2.1, procurement spending as a fraction
of aggregate U.S. GDP was relatively much greater in the early eighties than even
during the first part of this century. This indicator provides a frame of reference,
connecting output to procurement spending. It is similar in construction to the
indicator used by ? and other national level multiplier studies, and as such this
measure of spending will also be deployed in the next section in a DD framework.
It should be noted here too that while ? identifies the period after 2001 as another
buildup in this timespan, the size of spending in relative terms shown in figure 2.1 is
much less substantial when compared with the buildup in the early eighties5 .
While the aggregate trends in military procurement have shifted significantly between 1977 and 2006, the relative percent of spending received by States has changed
little over that same time span. California has consistently been the largest recipient
of procurement dollars receiving as much as 20% of total procurement spending at
times and often the only State with double digit percent of receipts. Meanwhile some
States that typically receive little spending such as Wyoming garner well less than
one tenth of one percent of the total6 . It is also useful to note that while California
consistently receives the largest percentage of contract spending (except for in 2005
when Virginia received more), most States in the high percentage group receive more
than ten times the amounts received by the lowest group.
5 While

Virginia has experienced a substantial buildup of relative spending for some time,
the other states in this figure have really only one shock, at 1982, which is more typical for
most states in the panel.
6 The

raw procurement data is inclusive of military contracting procured both domestically and abroad. Domestic spending typically accounts for the vast majority of contracting;
typically 90% or more of the total procurement spending
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Also the top and bottom ten States have changed position relatively little, as
is clearly evident in table 2.17 . The fact that there is little change in the relative
position of State’s rankings is useful for DD analysis, which can be biased if there is
significant change in group designation during the course of the experiment (?)8 .
To better understand the impact of this spending, again see figure 2.1. The figure
visualizes the trends of two States each from the highest and lowest proportion groups
compared with the national aggregate trend, where the difference between the two
groups is clear. Groups that tend to get large proportions of spending experience
a greater degree of volatility of this indicator when compared with low proportion
groups. Table 2.2 lists the standard deviations for the five series listed in figure 2.1,
where the two low proportion groups have much lower standard deviations than do
the large proportion groups.
To further the understanding of the trend in U.S. aggregate, relative procurement
spending see figure 2.2, which displays the percentage change in aggregate domestic
contract spending on the previous year relative to U.S. GDP, both nominal and
deflated with the GDP deflator9 . Most notable is the large shocks in the early
eighties and around 2002. The difference in the United States aggregate trend between
figures 2.2 and 2.1 around 2002 is striking, but it is a direct result of the growth of real
U.S. output which is captured in 2.1. Clearly the difference is a direct result of the
construction of this relative spending indicator. The spending shocks associated with
the 2001-2002 period when compared with local observations may be significantly
7 Looking

at this snapshot of years, most States jump fewer than 10 places, only 30
percent of all States changed more than 10 spaces, and only Kentucky jumped more than
20 spaces
8 The

DD analysis performed here is not as subject to this bias since a group is created
for each State instead of arbitrary designations.
9 This

plot is a trend of the main indicator used in the regression estimation, namely G̃it
described in section 2.4
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large, when compared with historical data they are much smaller. This is principally
the result of steady GDP growth over the entire panel, ostensibly reducing the level
size of the shock at the aggregate. Since this study will be deploying the relative
spending measure as our source of shock, we will focus on the earlier period of spending
which has a much more substantial spending shock. This shock should provide a more
substantial impact on state economic output, as its size relative to output is much
larger.
Therefore this analysis will proceed by attempting to estimate the State level
multiplier using a DD framework, by focusing on the timing of our spending shock.
With the carter/Reagan buildup described in ? and ?, and analysis of our relative
spending index the clear spike in spending is in 1982, providing the shock timing for
the subsequent analysis.

2.4

Estimation

The main estimation technique used in this analysis is Difference-in-Differences. Using
DD analysis is attractive to researchers for its intuitive approachability and its power
to potentially avoid omitted variable bias. However as ? illustrate, the need for
careful experimental design is paramount in arriving at a meaningful estimate of
causal effects . What follows is a description of the experiment design, and how this
analysis will take steps in its identification strategy to ensure sound and unbiased
estimators are produced.
The two crucial identification issues with DD analyses are group selection and
treatment timing. Traditional DD estimations attempt to capture differences in averages across two groups, one treated and one the control. The assumption is made
that in the counter-factual absence of treatment, the difference between groups would
be unchanged over time.
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An essential part of any successful DD analysis is that the differences between
treatment and control groups be as small as possible, to reduce the potential for
omitted variable bias (?). The intuition in this result is that among similar groups,
the effect of treatment will be most clearly estimated, and not clouded by unobservable
effects. Greater degrees of similarity across groups will reduce the pool of possible
unobservable effects, producing a clean estimate of causal effects.
The United States are very often the laboratories for this literature; where subjects
across states are largely homogeneous relative to cross-country group studies. States’
relative homogeneity is characterized by a great deal of features, such as laws, culture,
language, and federal policy. In this landscape of relative homogeneity, heterogeneous
treatments across states provides a test, or a “natural experiment”. Resulting interstate studies of policy typically yield interesting and intuitive results10 .
Analysis using DD is scant in macroeconometric modeling, probably because of
the lack of data availability of comparable groups and more complicated experimental
design required. In the studies mentioned above, group selections are obvious, such as
injured workers for workers compensation insurance, or low wage earners for minimum
wage legislation, etc. For this study the treatment is military procurement spending,
and its dollar amount relative to other states. The subsequent decision of any state’s
group membership then becomes an arbitrary decision to the researcher, resulting in
a binary treatment variable to signal whether the group member received high or low
spending. Arbitrarily determining a spending threshold for high spending states and
low spending states would raise serious doubts about this analysis. The difficulty is
particularly at issue here as all states receive some contract dollars, even if they are
orders of magnitude smaller than top contracting states.
10 For

examples of interstate microeconomic studies see ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, and ?
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Fortunately a framework exists that both solves this group selection problem and
provides a more intuitive estimate in the state level multiplier that has been discussed
thus far. Instead of using military spending as a binary variable to distinguish between
high and low groups, this study will estimate spending as a continuous treatment (??).
As a result of this construction, each State belongs to its own group, and the treatment
is an individual level of procurement spending. Thinking of the DD framework in a
continuous sense is analogous to studying a controlled experiment for medication: the
binary case being a selection of treated and placebo groups, and the continuous case a
question of dosing rate. In this construction the estimator will be measuring the effect
of spending on State output, instead of the difference between effects in States with
higher levels of spending versus States that receive lower levels. Also when deploying
a continuous treatment variable, the regression coefficient produced is interpreted as
a fiscal multiplier, a convenient result of the construction of the relative spending
indicator which will be discussed shortly.
This addresses the first of the two main aspects of a DD study, group identification.
To isolate a meaningful shock in this study we start at the description of large scale
military buildups in the 21 century. A natural starting point is the buildup in the
early 1980 described by suggested by ?. An inspection of our data shows that the
spending buildup beginning in 1980 first peaks in 1982. Figure 2.2 shows that while
the change in spending begins in 1980, after deflating the data the, 1982 yields an
even larger spike in the change in spending, producing the peak in 1982 seen in figure
2.1. Therefore 1982 will provide the timing for the impact of the spending shock.
Furthermore, the DD framework’s power lies in the basis of a truly exogenous shock.
The following experiment will borrow the assumption employed by ?, that the federal
government does not embark on any large scale buildups for the benefit of any state
relative to other states. Combining this with the body of work around the use of
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military spending for its exogeneity, one can be fairly confident on the ability of this
experiment to guard against endogeneity bias.
Finally, the regression will use a subset of the data constrained to two time periods,
before and after the spending shock. Constraining the time is necessary to eliminate
any possibility of autocorrelation bias in the residuals, as suggested by ?11 . The
resulting framework yields a regression with data from two periods, a pre-shock and
post-shock year of 1982. As such the experiment outline captures a purely shortrun state multiplier, where the effect is only the immediate impact of the spending
shock. The estimation will follow standard panel estimation strategy for the control
of unobservable errors. The econometric DD model used in this analysis is as follows:

Ybit = β0 + β1 γtreat + β2 γtreat G̃it +

51
X

αi λi + it

(2.1)

i=1

where, Ybit =

Yit − Yit−1/Y

it−1

and G̃it =

Git − Git−1/Y

it−1

, and Yit and Git are real,

per-capita GSP and real per-capita military procurement spending, respectively, for
State i in year t. This construction is the continuous “treatment” DD regression,
where γtreat is the treatment year dummy, and λi represents State fixed effect for
state i. The coefficient of interest in this study is β2 , which captures the direct effect
of government spending on GSP embodied in the multiplier. In keeping with the
literature, the indicator here is analogous to that used in ? and ?, albeit with varying
time intervals12 . We also study the effects of government spending in a similar fashion
for employment, by replacing the left hand side with

Et − Et−1/E

t−1

.

11 ?

goes through great lengths to show, through Monte Carlo analysis, that DD estimations with more than two periods have a strong likelihood of overstating the significance
and committing type I error, if they do not explicitly account for this possible bias.
12 ?

use the indicator Gt − Gt−2/Yt−2 , suggesting that it is a parsimonious, albeit crude way
to capture the dynamics between spending and output
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2.4.1

Results and discussion

The regression results are listed in 2.3. First thing to note is that the coefficient
estimate for β2 is in the expected range at 1.19. The estimate is generally smaller
however than the main effect reported by ?, which is in the neighborhood of 1.5. It
is important to note that this is likely due to the very short-run nature of this effect.
Considering that there is considerable length to any shock of this size, it is reasonable
to figure that the effects will be drawn out for several years. In experiments such as ?,
one can view the multipliers as long run averages, capturing extended expansions (and
contractions) of military expenditures. If all of the spillover effects of these shocks
are accounted for it is reasonable to consider that the resulting multiplier would be
larger than estimated here.
The results of the current experiment are closely aligned with the existing literature of New Keynesian frameworks based on sticky prices. Note that this literature
describes the bulk effects of any spending shock being felt right after the impact and
slowly decaying to the trend over the following years. This further reinforces the
notion that the estimated coefficient in this paper are expected to be smaller in size
than those estimated in long run frameworks, such as ? and others.
Another thing to note is that these results are significantly different from those
exemplified by neoclassical models and alternative econometric models employing
defense data (??). Consider the important notion of unity again, where multiplier
coefficients greater than unity versus less than unity imply that the effects of spending
will be beneficial or wasteful, respectively. While not as large as other New Keynesian
studies, this estimate provide further evidence into the school of thought that fiscal
spending is beneficial instead of wasteful, particularly if the goal is a short run boost
to output as is captured here.
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The impact on employment is not nearly in the comparable range as reported by
?, with the estimates for their employment multiplier are in the range of 1.3 to 1.8,
and the estimate in the study here is .29. The vast gap between these estimates provides significantly more emphasis on the notion that this study explicitly focuses on
the short-run impact. The lower multiplier on employment growth suggests a more
sluggish response by labor markets to this spike in spending. Considering the typical story regarding sticky prices and accounting for annually based labor contracts,
significant lagged labor response to a sizable spending shock should not be entirely
unexpected. Therefore this short-run impact multiplier estimate would be expected
to be relatively lower than analogous long run studies. The effect is still substantial
here however, providing an on impact boost to employment of .3 percent for a 1
percent spike in relative spending.
As a check against the per-capita, real data employed in the baseline results, the
regressions are replicated using level real and level nominal data series as well. The
results for these regressions are also listed in table 2.3. Note that the results are
largely unchanged by deflating the data, or adjusting for population flows via percapita transformations, with estimates and their respective standard errors within .03
points of the baseline coefficient estimate.
Going back to the periods of defense buildup suggested by ? and ?, we can test
a second spending shock contained in the bounds of this panel, specifically the shock
originating from the War on Terror beginning on 9/11. Looking at our data in the
span of this military buildup, again considering figures 2.1 and 2.2 an alternative
possible spending shock could be 2002. Replicating the analysis with consideration of
this as a point of defense spending shock however does not yield a coefficient that is
statistically different from zero. The insignificant result is suggestive of the presence
of a threshold, one that spending shocks must first reach before their magnitude (as
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measured relative to output) is substantial enough to impact GSP. It is quite possible
that either the relatively lower spike in spending for 2002 is not effective at moving
output growth, or that the relatively lower shock does not yield enough variation to
provide statistical precision13 . The question of the existence of a threshold, above
which spending provides an effective tool to impact state level output and below
which there is no measurable effect on output, is a fruitful topic for further research.

2.5

Concluding Remarks

The goal of this study was to estimate a State level, short-run relative fiscal multiplier
through the use of DD estimation and a rich set of data on military procurements
across the United States. By focusing on the spending shock in 1982, multiplier
estimates produced are between 1.17 and 1.21, which is in the lower range of studies
like ? and many New Keynesian studies, but critically larger than typical neoclassical
models suggest.
Furthermore these estimates are directly within the range described by ? who
broadly surveys the literature on these estimation attempts. The resulting set of
estimates strengthen the notion that the true fiscal multiplier is perhaps in the range
of slightly larger than unity, which helps temper some of the more extreme views of
very large or virtually non existent estimates, and builds confidence in the power of
13 ?

and ? suggest that the news announcement of the buildup should encapsulate the
timing of the shock, emphasizing forward looking rational expectations. They suggest a
timing of 1980 and 2001 as spending shock years, even though the peak shock in relative
spending is clearly in 1982 and 2002. Replication of the experiments above with these
suggested shock timings yields coefficients that are not statistically different from zero,
again suggesting that the power of a shock is embodied in exceeding a certain threshold.
Setting the timing in this framework at 1980 or 2001 may capture the news shock, but does
not measure the impact of the spending shock itself.
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fiscal policy. Also,since these estimates are inherently focused on the short run, they
may understate the full, multi-year effect of fiscal policy on state output.
The present study’s estimation of the effects on employment is however significantly lower than those found in ?. The most likely reasoning for this is once again
the short-run nature of this experiment. Labor contracts are typically sluggish to
adjust and based on year long terms. Also, the lag between spending shocks and
contractors actions on these new dollars, then leading to employers reactions to the
new economic environment and ultimately their hiring decisions may be substantially
longer than a single year’s time. A 0.3 percent increase in employment growth is far
from insubstantial, but it is possible that this estimate understates the full impact of
spending on employment when accounting for labor market sluggishness.
The primary benefit of the approach outlined here was to produce unbiased estimates, combining military spending, typically held up as a source of exogenous
spending, with an estimation strategy to guard against endogeneity bias. Another
benefit to this slightly disaggregated study is to hold fixed any fluctuations in monetary policy or federal tax policy that could mask the true estimates, allowing an even
clearer picture of fiscal spending effects.
As this study is focused on the short-run impact of a spending shock, future work
could be focused on expanding the time horizon of this study. The main benefit of a
time extension would be to more fully capture the multiplier, combining the impact
of the shock and subsequent spillovers throughout the state economies over time.
Building a dynamic econometric model to capture the time path of a spending shock
could provide a better idea of the longer run efficacy of fiscal spending.
Additionally, exploring the possible existence of a threshold of spending, above
which fiscal policy is effective in impacting the economy and below which the impact
is inconsequential, may be a fruitful avenue of research. If the fiscal multiplier behaves
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in a variable, non-linear fashion, the non-linear nature may go a long way in explaining
the historical difficulty in pinning down multiplier estimates.
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Figure 2.1: This figure charts multiple series of procurement spending relative to output, or Git /Yit . The data used here
(GDP, GSP, and procurement spending) is all in nominal terms.
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Figure 2.2: Above is the trend in the percentage change in procurement spending relative to aggregate output,at an annual frequency, in both nominal and real terms. Note the real series is deflated with real (aggregate) GDP deflator post
aggregation.
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and bottom ten states at roughly ten year intervals.The purpose of this graph is to emphasize both the gap between the largest and
smallest recipients of dollars and their relative static positions across the panel.

Table 2.1: This table provides a snapshot of the ranked proportion of total procurement dollars received by states, listing the top

Percent of Total Government Procurement Spending by State
Top Ten States
1977
1987
1997
2006
California
20.773%
California
18.449%
California
16.894%
California
12.958%
New York
8.926% Massachusetts 6.918%
Virginia
11.084%
Virginia
11.325%
Texas
6.221%
Texas
6.821%
Texas
7.434%
Texas
10.534%
Connecticut
5.949%
New York
6.618%
Florida
5.587%
Missouri
4.161%
Missouri
5.714%
Virginia
6.093%
Missouri
4.733%
Florida
3.889%
Massachusetts 5.391%
Missouri
4.477%
Georgia
4.191%
Arizona
3.824%
Florida
4.182% Massachusetts 4.053%
Maryland
3.735%
Virginia
3.980%
Washington
3.839%
Ohio
4.008%
Maryland
3.704% Massachusetts 3.670%
Pennsylvania
3.526%
Connecticut
3.633%
Pennsylvania
3.201%
Connecticut
3.427%
New Jersey
2.697%
Maryland
3.388%
New York
2.875%
Pennsylvania
3.222%
Bottom Ten States
1977
1987
1997
2006
South Dakota 0.031%
Wyoming
0.035%
Wyoming
0.046%
Delaware
0.044%
Wyoming
0.061% South Dakota 0.043%
Vermont
0.059%
Wyoming
0.051%
Montana
0.074%
Idaho
0.054%
Montana
0.075%
Idaho
0.057%
Nevada
0.082%
Montana
0.064% South Dakota 0.081% North Dakota 0.082%
North Dakota 0.085%
Vermont
0.108%
Delaware
0.089%
Montana
0.085%
Delaware
0.122% North Dakota 0.117%
Idaho
0.120% South Dakota 0.113%
Vermont
0.133% West Virginia 0.120% North Dakota 0.128% West Virginia 0.124%
West Virginia 0.203%
Delaware
0.137% West Virginia 0.135%
Rhode Island
0.151%
Nebraska
0.207%
Nevada
0.204%
Arkansas
0.190%
Nebraska
0.233%
Rhode Island
0.232%
Nebraska
0.207%
Nebraska
0.245%
Vermont
0.259%

Volatility of Spending Across States
United States Aggregate
California
Virginia
South Dakota
Wyoming

0.006807
0.015574
0.014469
0.002232
0.001479

Table 2.2: This table displays the standard deviations relative military procurement spending from 1977-2006, for the countries listed in figure 2.1. Notice that Virginia and California
have much higher standard deviations than do Delaware and Wyoming, and the United
States on the aggregate.

Regression Coefficient Estimates

β1
-0.0524719
(.0087)***

Baseline Per Capita, Deflated
GSP
Employment
2
β2
R̄
β1
β2
1.1972425 .2046 -.0269562 .2928872
(.0021)*** (.1367)**
(.5746)**

β1
-0.0566153
(.0085)***

Level Data, Deflated
GSP
Employment
2
β2
R̄
β1
β2
1.1709775 .2273
-.027026
.290604
(.5579)**
(.0021)*** (.1364)**

β1
-0.096297
(.0096)***

Level Data, Nominal
GSP
Employment
2
β1
β2
β2
R̄
1.212528 .3279 -.0274709 .2694835
(.5466)**
(.0021)*** (.1229)**

R̄2
.3740

R̄2
.3740

R̄2
.3745

Table 2.3: Standard errors appear beneath parameter estimates and stars indicate significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent mark for one, two and three stars, respectively. This table
contains six separate regressions, one for GSP and for employment as outlined in 2.4, with
per-capita deflated as the baseline, then again for aggregated state level deflated data, and
finally aggregated state level nominal data. Also only data on spending and output has
been deflated or population adjusted.
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CHAPTER 3
MILITARY PROCUREMENT AND INCOME INEQUALITY

3.1

Introduction

A good deal of attention has been paid to the degree of income inequality in the
United States of late. Developing alongside the growing income gap is the changing
state of this nation’s military industrial complex. Typically the two are viewed as
separate issues in the political economic landscape, and few scholars ask about the
possible impacts on income inequality from such a large source of fiscal spending.
The current essay hopes to shed a bit of light on the relationship, by scrutinizing the
impact of defense contracting dollars on income inequality at the State Level.
With the concentration of income at the top of the distribution higher than it has
been since the 1920’s1 , more and more politicians are finding it increasingly difficult
to ignore growing public unrest. Also, discontent over the level of inequality has been
exacerbated by the recent severe recession and real economic losses experienced by all
strata of the population. The result of these recent events has pushed policy makers
to directly address inequality.
The debate around income inequality has provided a stark foil against another
contentious aspect of the federal budget, national defense spending. The past decade
saw birth to the war on terror and two large-scale wars in The Middle East, whose
compounded costs have not faded in the public consciousness. In general, the dynamics of the post World War II military experience in the U.S. has molded the defense
budget into a bipartisan, political sacred cow. However since the recession, this status
1?

provide a succinct and accurate summary of the state of income inequality in the
United States, using a variety of common sources. The income inequality disparity was at
its recent peak just prior to the great recession for earners at the top one percent, after
which the income share declined sharply but has again increased. As will be refereed to
later, for more detailed analysis of income dynamics see ?
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quo is being questioned and it is not surprising that policy makers are scrutinizing
all facets of the federal budget. In the face of these two policy flash-points, the signing of the Budget Control Act of 2011 (BCA) poses interesting questions about the
state of income inequality. With the BCA enacting the first significant cuts to the
defense budget in recent history, it is still unclear how these cuts may impact income
inequality.
This study seeks to better quantify the relationship between income inequality
and defense contracting directly by employing an extensive data series on military
procurement and on income inequality at the state level. Typically studies of this
sort are characterized in terms of a guns-versus-butter trade-off: more spending on
defense related endeavors, the “guns”, can lead to a reduction in available resources
for public services, or “butter” (??). Historically, scholars have attempted to estimate
the existence of this trade off between defense and social spending to varying degrees of
success (???). Typically these studies use aggregate level spending on social programs
and infer subsequent welfare implications, where this study directly looks at income
inequality.
The following analysis finds that across model specifications the relationship between inequality and military spending is generally positive. In other words, increasing spending on military procurements leads to higher degrees of income inequality.
The bulk of studies that have scrutinized this relationship find a similar result, with
different measures of military spending or inequality indices (??). However these
studies are often constrained by length and quality of the data deployed, where the
time spans are typically about a decade at most and the time frequencies are often
once every few years. Combining several sources this study capitalizes on the use of
annual frequency data, for a time span of greater than 40 years.
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Another novel component of the present study is its use of panel techniques across
the 50 states to help account for otherwise unobservable influences. Many of the previous studies focus on national level data often in cross country panel frameworks that
focus on a wide group of countries (?) or focus on specific global regions (?). The
benefits of using the United States as the cross sectional unit in panel studies is not
entirely new, where the relatively homogeneity of these units is desirable. This conformity provides better control for unobservable effects by effectively reducing them
or holding them constant, where the presence of differences in language, currency,
culture, regulations, freedom of labor and capital flows, and laws can cloud cross
country results. A specific benefit here is greater control of unobservable, country
specific policy effects aimed at affecting inequality or military policy by holding these
components fixed across groups.
It is crucial to understand the relationship between defense spending and inequality, as the landscape of military procurement, and government spending more
generally, is poised to change significantly in the coming years. The BCA has ordered
sequestration across the federal government budget, which impacts the department
of defense to the tune of 470 billion dollars over the coming decade. While few would
argue for the use of defense budgets as a tool for economic policy, it is impossible to
ignore its effects on the greater economy. Larger than the size of the DoD budget relative to the total budget is defense contracting relative to overall contracting, which
accounts for the vast majority of federal procurement dollars. As illustrated in 1.5,
the department of defense typically accounts for 70 percent of all federal contracts,
and in recent years this has amounted to between 170 and 360 billion dollars each
year. Because defense procurement is such a large share of total procurement, one
may be tempted to generalize the findings in this study to government procurement
spending more broadly, however this would be a mistake. Studies have outlined how

102

defense contracts are inherently different from other federal contracts, from the labor
skill set they employ to the fact that their demand typically is partitioned from policy
makers other economic decisions (??). Again however, the size of defense procurements in both relative and absolute terms necessitates greater understanding of it’s
varied impacts on the economy as a whole.
The outline of this essay is as follows. The next section will provide a brief
literature review, followed by a detailed account of the data sources utilized in this
study, and the potential problems presented by this data. Section four outlines the
experimental methodology and presents the results. Section five provides concluding
remarks.

3.2

Defense and Inequality: Literature Review

The discussion of income inequality in economic literature has come in waves, falling
in and out of fashion usually corresponding to political and social current events.
The work of ?2 has done a great deal to comprehensively catalog the state of income
distributions in the United States at the national level for this past century. In their
coverage the authors illustrate how the income share of the top decile of earners has
experienced a U shape, decreasing after the Great Depression until it changed course
in the 1970’s and began to increase again. Piketty and Saez also describe how the
nature of those incomes received by the top earners has changed. In the early part
of the 20th century capital rental incomes accounted for the largest share, whereas
more recently top earners income is mostly generated from wages and entrepreneurial
work.
2 The

main contribution of this work is to generate a time-series measure of inequality
that covers roughly the past century using tax return data, and has since been updated
include more current estimates of inequality for the nation. Furthermore, ? describes the
historical income dispersion from a global context.
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Taking a subnational approach, ? follows the methodology of ? and produces
a similar series of inequality measures for each of the 50 states plus the District of
Columbia. ? finds a similar U pattern over the past few decades for most states,
where some states experience greater inequality while others do not see as dramatic
changes. The data produced by ? is one key source of data for this analysis.
More in line with the current study are papers that attempt to estimate a tradeoff between defense spending and spending on social welfare programs. These guns
versus butter arguments are focused on estimating the existence and direction of
a relationship between federal spending on defense and federal spending on social
programs. Many previous studies have encountered great difficulty in empirically
demonstrating the existence of this trade-off, where attempts to estimate these effects
directly provides little to no evidence (??). ? uses a disaggregated analysis on the
subsets of the defense budget, and finds no existence of the effect prior to the Reagan
defense build up, but a trade-off during the early 1980’s. Also, ? find no suggestion
of a direct link between military expenditures and social spending but find indirect,
longer term effects of defense spending crowding out spending on education.
The majority of these earlier studies utilized measurements from a variety of
sources for both defense spending and social spending. While the impact on social
spending has implications for inequality, inequality is typically peripheral to these
analyses. ? suggests that the existence of a trade-off would result in a positive
relationship between income inequality and defense spending. His justification for this
relationship lies in the composition of employment generated by defense contracts,
which is concentrated in high skilled, engineering and science jobs and has relatively
few lesser-skilled, “blue collar” jobs. The following analysis will depart from these
earlier studies by directly using a variety of income inequality measures to estimate
the relationship as directly as possible.
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One of the earliest studies to directly estimate inequality and defense spending is
?, who estimates a positive relationship while providing a description of the extent
of pay differentials between defense and non-defense sectors. He postulates that the
existence of sectoral pay differentials coupled with the concentration of defense related
jobs to white males relative to women and minorities exacerbates inequality levels.
The analysis in ? is based on national U.S. statistics and as such the most closely
related study to the present one, albeit at a higher level of aggregation. Another key
distinction here is our use of military procurements, when compared to Abell’s use of
overall military expenditures as the source of fiscal shock.
Since ?, several studies have inspected this relationship and found a similar positive effect for a variety of countries and regions of the globe. The majority of other
studies that directly discuss this relationship suggest higher inequality is a result of
increased military spending (?????). ? looks at a dynamic familiar to the economy more broadly; shifts towards higher capital intensity have caused displacement
of lower skilled workers, which has exacerbated the positive relationship between inequality and defense spending in recent years.
There are a a few studies that find either no evidence, or slight evidence for the
opposite effect of a reduction in income inequality. ? demonstrate the difficulty
in empirically producing evidence to show the existence of a relationship between
income dispersion and defense spending, while ? finds that the experience of Middle
Eastern and North Africa actually displays a tendency for decreases in inequality
from increases in military expenditures. In a related context, instead of focusing
directly on expenditures, ? look at the military participation and find that increased
conscription in the armed forces reduces the level of income inequality, suggesting
that military service is a useful method to improve one’s station in life, particularly
for those who may have few economic alternatives.
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The following analysis aims to add to the body of literature in a few key ways. First
many of these analyses use defense budgets or estimates of defense spending from third
party sources such as the Stockholm International Peace Research institute (SIPRI),
IMF or World Bank3 . Ultimately these sources use official statistics when available
but often times for non-OECD or lesser developed countries these statistics are based
on estimates or survey results. The following analysis uses military procurement
data directly observed from individual contracts and aggregated to the state level,
instead of either using a proxy such as budgets or even estimated budgets when official
statistics are unavailable4 . Also many of these countries are limited by the availability
of data, be that the time span of their data or the observed frequency, which in some
cases occurs as infrequently as once every five years. Our study suffers from neither
constraint, with data at an annual frequency from 1966 through 2011.
In addition to the benefits listed above, the following analysis will provide more
precision by using a disaggregate, sub-national analysis of spending across states.
Many of these panel level studies utilize cross-country experiments, with a broad
global or regional focus. The benefits of panel data analysis, specifically controlling
unobservable effects, are larger when the observational units exhibit more homogeneity or the potential set of unobservable effects is smaller. There is a vast array of
unobservable effects that vary widely across countries and can impact both inequality and defense spending: federal policies such as taxation, monetary policy, civil
rights regulation, social program spending, or supreme court rulings as well as cul3 SIPRI

uses published statistics when available, but also relies on budgets, and secondary sources to aggregate their statistics. Details in their methodology are located at
http://www.sipri.org/.
4 Budgets

represent outlays that can take years to decide and may ultimately not reflect
the actual dollar figure spent, although it is often the best replacement for direct expenditure
data. Many of the estimates for countries expenditures are collected via surveys or from
third parties financial analyses of the country in question and can be subject to measurement
error inherent in this process.
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tural and societal norms. Using the fifty states (plus D.C.) as our sample set keeps
all of these sources of variation fixed, and provides greater homogeneity in individual
units, allowing more precise estimates of the parameters of interest.

3.3

Data Sources

The data employed in the analysis here are compiled from a variety of sources, including the Bureau of Economic Analysis, the Bureau of Labor Statistics, the United
States Census Bureau and the Department of Defense. Additionally state level income inequality measures are sourced from ?. Combined, these data sources form
a panel of state level data from 1966 - 2005, where a great deal of information is
available.
The first main portion of data consist of DoD procurement spending, which comes
from the DoD form DD 350. The form also includes information on location and
signing date, allowing us to appropriately aggregate the data into a panel of state
level aggregate contract dollars, at an annual frequency.
The second source of data at the core of the empirical study here is the state panel
on income inequality produced by ?. The author compiles six long term measures of
state level inequality using IRS data. As suggested by ?, I will focus my attention
primarily on the two measures that the IRS data best captures, specifically the top
decile and percentile shares of income5 , but also test the remaining measures of income
5 Here

? and ? explain that the IRS data is truncated at the lower end. Individuals
earning below a varying threshold depending on years, age, and household composition,
are not required to file with the IRS, essentially omitting these low earning households
from typical measures. While this will not affect the top decile and percentile shares which
use top household statistics and aggregate income data, it will affect other measures of
inequality such as the GINI coefficient, Theil and Atkinson indices which include the lower
levels of households in their calculations.
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inequality as a check for the baseline estimates. The series created by ? extends from
1945-2011, and is available for the same time window as procurement data.
In addition to the two main sources of information in this study is state gross
domestic product, gathered from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. All GSP series
are in current dollar measures available for a period of time encompassing both our
measure of inequality and military spending. We will also use National Aggregate CPI
data from the BLS as a check against inflation. We deflate both state procurement
dollars, and GSP using the CPI. The base year for the CPI index used in this study
is 1983-1984.
State level population data is derived from the U.S. Census. Since the census
is conducted once every decade, the inter-survey years are population interpolation
estimates, also generated by the Census Bureau. We utilize all State population series
to control for population flows between states and potential effects this may have on
the estimations. Employment data is compiled from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
Each state series is collected from the total non-farm state employees, annually from
1965 through 2010. Unfortunately total hours or average weekly hours worked at the
state level are only available from 2007 and on so we use the employment count in
levels per state-year. The resulting dataset is a balanced panel from 1966-2011 for all
our groups.

3.4

Estimation and Analysis

The main estimation strategy utilizes a panel data setup, containing annual observations for state level inequality, military contract spending as our main data series
of interest. Also included to help control for omitted variable bias are GSP, state
employment rate as well as state population. We utilize the following regression to
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estimate the data:
iit = β0 +

l
X

β1,j+1 (gi,t−j ) +

j=0
l
X

β3,j+1 (ei,t−j ) +

j=0

l
X

β2,j+1 (yi,t−j ) +

j=0
l
X

β4,j+1 (ni,t−j ) + σi + it

j=0

In the above equation, iit represents the state level inequality measured by the share
of income earned by the top 10 percent of households, with indices denoting state i in
year t. The following right hand side variables are included in contemporaneous and
lagged forms; git reflects the state total amount of military contract spending, yit is
gross state product, eit is state employment rate and nit is state population. For more
comparability across measures and estimates, all variables have been transformed
in natural logarithms, denoted by lower case variables. σi is the state fixed effect
component.
Baseline fixed effects estimations are carried out on this model, with the results
reported in table 3.1. The contemporaneous effect presents with an unexpected sign.
The estimate suggests that increases in contracting reduces the ratio of top incomes
is opposite to the general findings across the literature. Upon visually inspecting the
data in figure 3.1 evidence of unit root processes is present in some of the state series.
figure 3.1 displays both the aggregate spending in each state, and the path of the top
decile fraction of income. One can see a clear upward trend in inequalities across the
time span for all states. The upward trend however less clear for contract spending,
with some states seeing a steady increase over time and others stable or decreasing
spending levels. While not reported, similar trends are present in the GSP panel
and population panels, while the employment rate presents the least visual evidence
towards a unit root series.
To safeguard against the possibility of panel unit roots present in the data here,
a series of panel unit root tests are deployed on all variables used in the estimations,
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specifically the tests proposed by ? (LLC), ? (IPS) and ? (Hadri)6 . For each of
the five variables used, there is substantial evidence of the presence of a unit root
process in at least some of the panels. First differencing all variables produces stationary series for the inequality index and military spending. For GSP, employment,
and population however, the Hadri test still suggests evidence of non-stationarity,
suggesting a higher order of integration. Second differencing these three series yields
sufficiently stationary data, passing all three tests. Also note here that by log differencing the data, estimates produced describe the effects of changes on growth rates
for the two main indices of interest.
Equation 3.4 is again estimated now on the appropriately differenced, stationary
series. Now we can see in table 3.1 that the results that were previously surprising
now yield the correct sign however are not statistically significant. In the presence of
unaccounted heteroskedasticity or autocorrelation in the errors, estimation precision
will suffer. As the regression estimation contains contemporaneous and lagged values
of the data, tests for these characteristics are conducted on the panel to ensure robust
standard error estimation.
Estimations through FGLS provides the ability to conduct a likelihood ratio test
for a homoskedastic error structure across panels. Conducting a likelihood ratio test
with the homoskedastic model nested rejects the notion of homoskedastic errors in
favor of a heteroskedastic structure7 . Furthermore, ? suggests methods for testing
6 The

first two of these tests, often referred to as thee Levin-Lin-Chu test and the ImPesaran-Shin tests, consider a null with the existence of unit roots in the panels, while the
Hadri test is for a null of stationarity.
7 The

LR test is performed with the assumption of heteroskedasticity as the unrestricted
form, and the homoskedastic model nested within, and estimated through iterated GLS
framework to provide a log likelihood, for a straightforward LR test. This test yields a
χ2 (50) = 293.28, which strongly favors the use of a heteroskedastic model across panels.
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against the presence of autocorrelation in the residuals8 . The test for serial correlation
is less emphatic, with the decision resting just above the 10 percent level, barely
rejecting the presence of autocorrelated errors.
To scrutinize the possibility of serially correlated errors two estimation strategies
are compared, first using a parameterized panel specific AR(1) error structure and
again assuming no serial correlation. The results from these two estimations are displayed in tables 3.2 and 3.3, respectively. Overall the impact on either estimation is
not large, failing to increase precision or change the sign for many variables. The first
line in each table represents the estimates with the top decile’s share as our dependent
variable. Estimations utilizing a FGLS model accounting for heteroskedasticity seems
to improve estimate precision for some of our variables, however the main variable
of interest is still uninformative, suggesting that there is little evidence of a relationship between military spending and the top decile’s share of income, at a minimum
changing sign from the initial negative coefficient estimate to positive ones that we
would expect based on the previous literature.
Tables 3.2 and 3.3 also display the regressions utilizing the top one percent’s share
of income, which presents some interesting findings compared with the top decile. The
results suggest that while there is no measurable effect of contract dollars on the top
decile’s income share, military contract spending does impact those at the very top
one percent. Specifically the regression suggests that a one percentage change in the
growth rate of military spending will increase the growth rate of top income shares
by around 25 hundredths of a percent contemporaneously and 23 hundredths of a
percent the following year.
8 Specifically,

Wooldridge suggests conducting the regression with the assumption of
autocorrelated errors, collecting those residuals and estimating an AR(1) regression with
them. Significance testing on the resulting autoregressive coefficient is the test for serial
correlation in the error structure.
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At first it sounds like a small effect, but a large magnitude shouldn’t be expected.
To provide a foil for comparison, taking the average contracting spending across states
and years in this panel, a one percent increase represents an increase of roughly 19
million dollars. The BCA cut an average of 740 million in the defense budget per state
in the second half of 2013 alone9 , and past military buildups have contributed large
scale increases in spending. Expanding on this consider that the average growth rate
of military procurement dollars across all states and years is .5 percent growth per
year. Many individual years experience the average growth rate across states greater
than ten percent in absolute value. In the context of past military expansions, an effect
of 23 or 25 hundredths of a percent rise in the growth rate of top percentile income
shares can compound into an economically large effect quite quickly, particularly in
years that experience large and sudden buildups.
To better understand the between these two main results it is necessary to understand what differentiates these groups of households. The work of ? characterizes
the distribution of incomes in the United States over the past many decades in great
detail. They find that the decades most relevant to this study have seen a shift in
the sources of income earned by the top decile compared with earlier in this century;
from being in large part rental income towards being predominantly made up of wage
income. While this change in sources of income is true across the entire decile, it is
more visible for households in the upper decile outside the upper one percent, and
accounts for roughly 90 percent of all income for households at the lower end of this
range

10

. ? suggest that these upper decile wage earners today are mostly made up

of high skilled workers and entrepreneurs, such as doctors, lawyers, and upper level
9?

discusses the immediate impact of the sequestration, stating that 37 billion was cut
from the DoD’s budget for the second half of 2013, and expects to amount to upwards of
470 billion over the following decade.
10 Lower

end of the range of the decile refers here to the 90th -95th percentiles
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management, instead of the rentiers of the early 20th century. They also point out
that the threshold for the upper 10 percent across the United States in 1998 starts
at $81,700, while the threshold for the upper one percent begins at $230,200. ? also
show that within the upper one percent of households, between 20 and 35 percent
of income comes from entrepreneurial sources, such as self-employment, partnership,
and business ownership incomes.
? propose that the ongoing shift towards the “new” military that is increasingly
more capital intense has lead to the relationship where increasing military spending
produces more inequality. However, they postulate that this effect is caused by increased demand for high skilled, expert level talent which reduces the demand for
low skilled, less trained labor. If the change in labor demand indeed were the case,
one would expect a positive estimated effect on the top decile’s share of income,
which contains many of these high skilled professionals. The upper one percent of
incomes here encompasses upper managers, owners and executives of companies involved in contracting. The upper one percent threshold likely surpasses the majority
of engineering and scientists that are otherwise captured by the top decile measure,
suggesting that the effect noted by ? is not significant.
These results are troubling. Military contracting is not often touted by politicians
as a source of economic largess to their constituents. That said, the attempts to
direct federal funds towards their districts are well known and even expected by some
(?). These results suggest that this may very well be the case. In particular the
beneficiaries of an increase in contract dollars are members of the increasingly small
owner class, with gains passing over the new upper professional class described by ?.
The average constituent should be alarmed by the use of these funds as pork
barrel type spending. Local congressmen and women often stump on records of
directing defense contracts to their districts, as engines of job creation. The evidence
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suggests that gains from these dollars are concentrated at the upper one percent of
households at the expense of the population at large. Seeing as wealthy households
are typically more politically connected these findings are intuitive. To the extent
that there is significant fraud and abuse in the contracting system those who have
political connections stand to have the most to gain.

3.4.1

Alternative Measures of Inequality

As previously mentioned the two measures of inequality discussed so far are likely
the most robust to measurement error. Again as described in ?, the preference for
income shares is because the IRS does not require tax filings for all households,
specifically those below a certain threshold. The top earners share can be computed
even without observations on these lower distribution incomes because the information
can be supplemented with population and gross state income data. The other data
series however rely on the overall distribution of all income earners. Therefore to
the degree that these low income households do not report to IRS, these additional
measures may be under estimated. Furthermore the Atkinson and Theil index cannot
be computed for negative incomes, unlike the other measures. Therefore ? truncates
these incomes at zero, again potentially leading to misspecified results.
With the potential shortcomings in mind, it would still be advantageous to conduct
estimations using the alternative measures of inequality as a check against the primary
results. The regressions are specified analogously to those for the top decile share of
income11 . The remaining four measures of inequality are also listed in tables 3.2 and
3.3.
11 Specifically

for each measure of inequality, first differences are taken on the log transformed data, and then used to replace the first differenced top 10 percent income shares.
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The signs on significant estimates of interest are as expected. One common trend
across regressions is the relatively low magnitude of these coefficients. If we restrict
our attention to those coefficients that are significant, four of the five estimates range
from three to five thousandths of a percent effect on the inequality growth rate for
a one percent change in military contacting growth. Again consider that these inequality measures likely understate the degree of inequality, by conventions of the
IRS reporting protocol and the metric’s construction. If in fact the true values of
inequality are larger than these measures suggest, it is reasonable to consider that
these effects are also under estimated.
To provide some intuition on the results, consider the estimates of the effect on
the state GINI coefficient. With a one percent increase in the growth of contract
dollars, after two years the net impact would be near a hundredth percent rise in the
growth rate in inequality. While not particular large in the presence of such a small
shock, if there were perhaps a 10 percent shock, we would see sizable effects on income
inequality. As already mentioned 10 percent and larger shocks to procurement growth
are far from uncommon. A change in the growth rate in inequality by a tenth of a
percent in years of significant military expansion is a substantial impact and worthy
of notice, particularly considering the vast array of contributing factors to the income
distribution.
Therefore the results for the coefficient of interest are generally consistent across
all regressions. We typically see a modest and positive effect for both the contemporaneous and lagged values of contract spending on each inequality measure. These
estimates confirm the previous results, and bolster the notion that the relationship
between contract spending and inequality is positive.
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3.5

Concluding Remarks

The goal of the present study was to estimate the connections between inequality
and military contracting in the United States. The analysis was achieved using a
rich data set on individual military contracts compiled for the span of 1966-2005. In
addition, the state level inequality series produced by ? allows a panel level study
of the influence on inequality by military contracting in each state. In general the
findings of in our study suggest the existence of a positive relationship between defense
contracting growth and inequality growth.
While the findings of our study do not suggest any measurable effect of contracting
on the top decile household’s share of income, there is evidence of an effect on the
top one percentile household’s shares. Previous studies have demonstrated that the
shift towards capital intensive production of military goods have favored high skilled
labor and specialists over lower skilled workers, which would suggest more broad
based income gains at the top households. The results of this study suggest that the
broad income gains are not largely meaningful, as top decile households do not seem
affected by growth in contract dollar. The concentration of income gains caused by
procurement spending is at the very richest households, where the beneficiaries of
growth in contracting are most likely owners and top managers of firms involved in
contracting.
In addition to income shares measures, our study also looks at alternative measures of income inequality. The findings are generally consistent across various metrics: GINI coefficient, Atkinson index, relative mean deviation, and Theil index. The
typical effects measured are modest, positive relationships in inequality growth associated with an increase in DoD contracting growth. ? describes how many of these
series are likely underestimated based on several conventions of the IRS procedures
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and metric construction. If the true measures are in fact larger, it is feasible that the
true effects are also larger than measured here.
The main findings of this study, that DoD contracting does not affect upper middle
class households income shares, but does in fact impact the richest household’s incomes, is a troubling result. The impact on only the very highest households suggests
that military contracting dollars are a potent force for increasing income inequality
at the extreme of the distribution. That said, in the new atmosphere of bipartisan
budget cutting zeal, the overall effect of drastically lowered defense spending may
yield a net reduction in the share of income garnered by the top one percentile of
households.
With the implementation of the BCA, there may be real opportunities for future
work to more directly study the effects of contract spending on inequality as a result
of this significant law. Since the BCA is the first long term reduction in the defense
budget in memory, measuring its resulting effects on inequality will prove to be a
useful tool for future econometric analyses.
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Contract Spending by State
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Figure 3.1: This figure lists log transformed, aggregate contract spending for each state,
per year. Evidence of non-stationary data occurs in some states, but is hard to find in
others.
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Income Inequality by State
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Figure 3.2: This figure lists top decile’s share of income for each state, per year. Nonstationarity is much more evident in this data series.
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Population
t
t-1
-0.57485 0.62765
(.2954)* (.3172)*

†DenotesR2 = .7785, n = 2291, F (8, 50) = 91.78 for this regression. ‡Denotes: R2 = .0480, n = 2187, F (8, 50) = 7.08 for differenced regression. All the
above variables have been transformed by natural logarithms. Spending is the annual state aggregated contract spending total for each state. Spending and GSP have
been deflated using the national CPI, with a base year of 1983-1984. Employment rate and population are also WRT to each state. Standard errors for each estimate are
displayed below and asterisks denote statistical significance in the usual fashion.

Table 3.1:

State Fixed Effects†
Employment Rate
t
t-1
0.06708
-0.06596
(.0874)
(.0723)

Baseline Regression with State Fixed Effects - Differenced Variables‡
Spending
GSP
Employment Rate
Population
t
t-1
t
t-1
t
t-1
t
t-1
0.00042
0.00250
0.02631
-0.00697 0.08553
0.09914
0.48033 -0.08037
(.0020)
(.0016)
(.0251)
(.0182) (.0402)** (.0426)** (.1971)** (.1289)

Baseline Regression with
Spending
GSP
t
t-1
t
t-1
-0.02501 -0.00950
0.35140
-0.00813
(.0058)*** (.0055)* (.0878)*** (.0587)

Baseline Regression Estimates

121
0.00394
(.0015)**
-0.00351
(.0052)

RMeanDev

Theil

0.00349
(.0052)

0.00482
(.0015)***

0.00429
(.0017)**

0.01075
(.0032)***

0.02394
(.0062)***

-0.11619
(.0469)**

-0.00935
(.0140)

-0.03240
(.0154)**

-0.73129
(.0301)**

0.26242
(.0551)***

-0.08950
(.0472)*

-0.01680
(.0140)

-0.03669
(.0155)**

0.03138
(.0301)

0.09828
(.0555)*

0.90412
(.0849)***

0.08527
(.0248)***

0.07258
(.0278)**

0.53885
(.0535)***

0.12333
(.1003)

0.22889
(.0734)***

0.01945
(.0213)

0.06164
(.0235)***

0.05347
(.0464)

0.22280
(.0868)**

2.30434
(.1922)***

0.22933
(.0558)***

0.24212
(.0612)***

1.12934
(.1232)***

1.05058
(.2234)***

0.65192
(.1829)***

-0.06517
(.0529)

-0.00541
(.0580)

0.01076
(.1175)

-0.15858
(.2121)

Pop
t
t-1
0.49557
-0.01345
(.0703)***
(.0670)

All the above variables have been transformed by natural logarithms. Spending is the annual state aggregated contract spending total for each state.
Spending and GSP have been deflated using the national CPI, with a base year of 1983-1984. Employment rate and population are also WRT to each state. The left hand
inequality variable is listed for each respective regression on the left. Standard errors for each estimate are displayed below and asterisks denote statistical significance in
the usual fashion. These regressions are conducted using FGLS estimation strategy using a variance structure that allows heteroskedasticity in the error structures.

Table 3.2:

0.00503
(.0017)***

0.00453
(.0032)

Atkin 05

GINI

0.02548
(.0061)***

Top 1

Top 10

Spend
t
t-1
0.00054
0.00253
(.0018)
(.0018)

GLS Regression Estimates
GSP
Emp
t
t-1
t
t-1
0.02982
-0.00772
0.11697
0.12027
(.0167)*
(.0167)
(.0304)*** (.0264)***

122

0.00340
(.0031)
0.00491
(.0016)***
0.00393
(.0015)***
-0.00025
(.0050)

Atkin 05

GINI

RMeanDev

Theil

0.00226
(.0050)

0.00485
(.0015)***

0.00376
(.0016)**

0.01049
(.0031)***

0.01729
(.0057)***

-0.06988
(.0432)

-0.01994
(.0135)

-0.03100
(.0148)**

-0.07920
(.0290)***

0.26294
(.0495)***

-0.01479
(.0434)

-0.02010
(.0136)

-0.02798
(.0149)*

0.03340
(.0291)

0.15276
(.0499)***

0.74879
(.0770)***

0.10045
(.0238)***

0.06839
(.0261)***

0.52806
(.0507)***

-0.09853
(.0904)

0.06054
(.0681)

0.00095
(.0205)

0.03822
(.0226)*

0.02495
(.0447)

0.09410
(.0796)

2.00829
(.1753)***

0.23404
(.0530)***

0.23720
(.0578)***

1.04885
(.1162)***

0.86515
(.2029)***

0.48273
(.1687)***

-0.06272
(.0504)

0.00102
(.0550)

-0.04662
(.1112)

-0.12164
(.1949)

Pop
t
t-1
0.44395
-0.01615
(.0645)***
(.0621)

All the above variables have been transformed by natural logarithms. Spending is the annual state aggregated contract spending total for each state.
Spending and GSP have been deflated using the national CPI, with a base year of 1983-1984. Employment rate and population are also WRT to each state. The left hand
inequality variable is listed for each respective regression on the left. Standard errors for each estimate are displayed below and asterisks denote statistical significance in
the usual fashion. These regressions are conducted using FGLS estimation strategy using a variance structure that allows heteroskedasticity in the error structures, and
fits a panel specific AR(1) error structure.

Table 3.3:

0.01915
(.0057)***

Top 1

Top 10

GLS Regression Estimates: Autocorrelation Adjusted
Spend
GSP
Emp
t
t-1
t
t-1
t
t-1
0.00039
0.00198
0.02991
0.01106
0.06952
0.05738
(.0017)
(.0017)
(.0156)*
(.0156)
(.0279)** (.0249)**
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